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"CRIMTORTS" AS CORPORATE JUST DESERTSt
Thomas Koenig* and Michael Rustad**
Just as Grant Gilmore described "contorts" that lie on the borderline
between contract and tort law, the authors coin the term "crimtort" to
identify the expanding common ground between criminal and tort
law. Although the concept of crimtort can be broadly applied to many
areas of the law, this Article focuses on the primary crimtort rem-
edy-punitive damages. The deterrent power of punitive damages lies
in the wealth-calibration of the defendant's punishment. For corpora-
tions this means that punitive damages will reflect the firm's net
income or net worth. The theoretical danger is that juries will abuse
wealth by redistributing corporate assets in disregard of the purposes
of civil punishment. 7b support their argument that wealth is not be-
ing widely misused, the authors present an empirical study of a
decade of crimtort cases in which federal appeals courts upheld puni-
tive damages of $1 million or more. However, even though punitive
damage verdicts are generally proportional to corporate wealth, indi-
vidual cases such as Exxon Valdez raise troubling due process issues.
The authors propose instituting middle-range procedural protection
for crimtort defendants in order to accommodate the quasi-criminal
objectives of this legal hybrid.
Copyright © 1998 by Thomas Koenig and Michael Rustad.
t The phrase "just desert" is taken from the eighteenth-century German phi-
losopher Immanuel Kant, who articulated the retributive theory of justice. IMMANUEL
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(summarizing Immanuel Kant's theory of "just deserts' which held that punishment
should be proportionate to "their internal wickedness"). This Article benefited from
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INTRODUCTION
The late New York Yankees baseball star, Mickey Mantle,
once complained to Larry King about the folly of professional
baseball in assessing fixed fines against players who make
wildly different salaries. He stated, "[ylou know what really
makes me mad-they still fine these guys the same thing they
fined us. Me and Billy [Martin] got fined $500. That was a lot of
money [to us]. If I was making $5 million I'd say, 'Here, take an-
other."" This statement regarding the necessity of considering
disparities in wealth when calculating the amount of a fine
poses one of the central issues in the debate surrounding the
future of punitive damages. The fining of Mike Tyson three mil-
lion dollars for biting Evander Holyfield's ear during a
championship boxing match is a salient example of a wealth-
calibrated punishment at issue in this debate.2
The twenty-five million dollar award of punitive damages
assessed against O.J. Simpson illustrates the potency of this
type of wealth-based remedy. The punitive damages award
was based upon the extremely aggravated circumstances un-
derlying the murders of Nicole Simpson and Ronald
Goldman, and was calibrated to have the proper punitive ef-
fect given O.J. Simpson's wealth and imputed future
earnings.3 The remedy of punitive damages can both express
1. Respondent's Brief at 37 n.37, TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 509
U.S. 443 (1993) (No. 92-479) (citing Larry King Live (CNN television broadcast, Apr. 16,
1991)). In 1956, Mickey Mantle earned a salary of $30,000 which, when combined with
endorsements and bonuses, amounted to a total income of approximately $100,000. See
DICK SCHAAP, MICKEY MANTLE: THE INDISPENSABLE YANKEE 113, 129-30 (1961). In con-
trast, baseball player Barry Bonds of the San Francisco Giants currently earns an
annual salary of $11.45 million. See Barry Bonds Inks $22.9 Mil. Extension to Become
Top-Paid Player in Baseball, JET MAGAZINE, Mar. 10, 1997, at 48.
2. Criminal fines calibrated to the ability of the defendant to pay are currently
utilized in Germany, Scandinavia, and England. See George F. Cole, Making Them
Pay: Alternatives to Jail Hit the Pocketbook, LEGAL TIMES, Nov. 6, 1989, at 28; Making
the Punishment Fit the Income, SOLIC. J., Apr. 11, 1997, at 319 (describing English
fines based on "equality of hardship rather than equality of monetary penalty").
3. See B. Drummond Ayres, Jr., Jury Decides Simpson Must Pay $25 Million in
Punitive Award, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 1997, at A-1, -12. The O.J. Simpson civil jury
voted 11-1 on the question of liability for punitive damages and 10-2 on the actual
amount of the award assessed. See id. The jury had also awarded $8.5 million in com-
pensatory damages for the wrongful deaths involved in the case. The jury arrived at
this multimillion-dollar punitive damage award by using a model of potential or im-
puted earnings. See id. Even so, this award was "very large by any standard." See id.
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and appease community outrage when criminal prosecution
appears to the public insufficient for the conduct involved.
Punitive damage awards can also serve to punish and deter
the misuse of official power. In Zarcone v. Perry,4 a night court
judge had a coffee vendor arrested and marched into his court-
room in handcuffs for the offense of making coffee that the judge
and his deputy considered "putrid-tasting."5 The punitive dam-
ages awarded in Zarcone redressed the psychological harm
inflicted during the judge's malicious degradation ceremony.'
These types of awards demonstrate the power of punitive dam-
ages to punish quasi-criminal conduct that is in itself beyond
the reach of the criminal law.
Courts increasingly employ punitive damages to control the
abuse of organizational authority. As corporate power increases,
so does the need for effective legal sanctions to protect the pub-
lic interest.7 As C.S. Lewis observed:
The greatest evil is not now done in those sordid "dens of
crime" that Dickens loved to paint. It is not done even in
concentration camps and labor camps. In those we see its
final result. But it is conceived and ordered (moved, sec-
onded, carried and minuted) in clean, carpeted, warmed
and well-lighted offices, by quiet men with white collars
and cut fingernails and smooth-shaven cheeks who do not
need to raise their voice.'
Corporate malfeasance costs Americans hundreds of billions
of dollars annually and causes an untold number of preventable
deaths and injuries.9 Increasingly, the legal sanctions used to
4. 581 F.2d 1039 (2d Cir. 1978).
5. See id. at 1040.
6. The sociological term "degradation ceremony" has been used to describe the
rituals through which low-status individuals are humiliated by the powerful in order
to manipulate and reinforce social position or hierarchy. See Harold Garfinkel, Condi-
tions of Successful Degradation Ceremonies, 61 AM. J. SOC. 420, 420 (1956).
7. See Catharine Pierce Wells, Corrective Justice and Corporate Tort Liability,
69 S. CAL. L. REV. 1769, 1779 (1996) (discussing the various fairness and justice con-
cerns involved when a tort defendant is a corporation).
8. Paul Greenberg, Western Leaders, Look, Study and Ignore the New World
Disorder, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 14, 1994, at 17 (quoting a statement made by C.S. Lewis in
1941).
9. The costs of corporate crime are unascertainable, but they are certainly very
high:
It is estimated that corporate crimes in the form of faulty goods, monopolistic
practices, and similar law violations annually cost consumers between $174
billion and $231 billion. The loss to taxpayers from reported and unreported
WINER 1998]
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deter and punish corporations employ blend tort and criminal
remedies.
Tort law and criminal law traditionally have been thought of
as separate subjects with clear lines of demarcation 0 since the
latter half of the nineteenth century." However, the two areas of
law have always shared a common ground.12 Richard Posner has
described the division between civil and criminal law in legal
theory as overly dichotomous:
The conventional legal thinker draws an extremely sharp
line between civil law and criminal law and between torts
and contract. This tendency is due in part to failing to
take a functional approach.... The idea that criminal law
is about deterrence and civil law is about compensation is
a product of the same kind of conceptual and essentialist
thinking that underlies efforts to define the word law.'"
violations of federal regulations by corporations is between $10 billion and $20
billion. About $1.2 billion goes unreported in corporate tax returns each year.
Price fixing among corporations costs the consumer $60 billion a year.
... In addition, it has been estimated that each year 200,000 to 500,000 work-
ers are needlessly exposed to toxic agents such as radioactive materials and
poisonous chemicals because of corporate failure to obey safety laws.... Many
of the 2.5 million temporary and 250,000 permanent worker disabilities from
industrial accidents each year are the result of managerial acts that represent
culpable failure to adhere to established standards.
STEVEN VAGO, LAW & SOCIETY 163-64 (4th ed. 1994) (citations omitted).
10. A typical, simplistic explanation of the classic distinction made between tort
and criminal law is that a tortfeasor breaches a duty to the individual while a crimi-
nal breaches a duty to the public. See GEORGE E. RUSH, THE DICTIONARY OF CRIMINAL
JUSTICE (4th ed. 1994).
11. Torts did not even emerge as a distinct legal field until the 1850s. The first
American torts treatise was not written until 1859, and the first torts casebook was
not published until 1874. See G. Edward White, The Intellectual Origins of 7brts in
America, 86 YALE L.J. 671, 671 (1977); see also G. EDWARD WHITE, TORT LAW IN
AMERICA 231 (1980) (noting that "[in the late nineteenth century Torts became in-
creasingly conceived as a private law subject, not because it was inherently so suited,
but because a sharp line between 'private' and 'public' activity was consistent with
prevailing social wisdom").
12. The line between criminal and tort law has always been blurred. See United
States v. Shapleigh, 54 F. 126 (8th Cir. 1893) (noting the criminal aspects of what was
theoretically civil punishment).
13. RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW AND LEGAL THEORY IN ENGLAND AND AMERICA 54
(1996). The essentialist approach focuses on the fit of crimtorts to abstract doctrinal
principles while a functional approach examines the social impact of crimtort reme-
dies. See Gary Peller, Neutral Principles in the 1950's, 21 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 561,
579 (1988).
"Crimtorts" as Corporate Just Deserts
Just as there are torts which are subject to criminal sanction,
there are tort remedies that punish and deter. The term
"crimtort" is principally employed by this Article to describe the
expanding middle-ground between criminal and tort law. To a
lesser extent, "crimtort" also refers to civil punishment under-
taken by state and federal regulators. The doctrine of crimtorts
formally recognizes that there are private quasi-criminal prose-
cutions occurring within civil law. In the fields of antitrust,
securities, and environmental litigation, private attorneys fre-
quently initiate this type of civil punishment proceeding. This
Article traces the expansion of crimtorts in American law and
proposes a set of "middle range" level of procedural protections
for crimtort defendants. The contours of this framework are de-
veloped by means of an empirical examination of the classic
crimtort remedy-punitive damages.
The growing overlap between criminal and tort law is re-
flected in the expanded use of punitive damages to punish
misconduct by the powerful. This approach is controversial be-
cause civil sanctions blend the criminal law function of
punishment and deterrence with the tort law goal of reparation.
The issue of fairness then arises because conduct that is tor-
tious is increasingly punished in quasi-criminal proceedings
lacking the protection of the safeguards provided by the crimi-
nal justice system. However, the remedy of punitive damages
remains a vital doctrine because it "continues to serve the use-
ful purposes of expressing society's disapproval of intolerable
conduct and deterring such conduct where no other remedy
would suffice." 4
The explosion of punitive damages awards is part of the much
larger breakdown of the great divide between private and public
law.5 One commentator has observed, "the distinction between
criminal and civil law seems to be collapsing across a broad
front."6 Criminal and tort laws are blending to form an entirely
14. Jane Mallor & Barry Roberts, Punitive Damages: Toward a Principled Ap-
proach, 31 HASTINGS L.J. 639, 641 (1980).
15. See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, AMERICAN LAW 152-53 (1984) (noting that the
distinction between public and private law can be traced to classical Roman Law).
16. Mary M. Cheh, Constitutional Limits on Using Civil Remedies to Achieve
Criminal Law Objectives: Understanding and Transcending the Criminal-Civil Law
Distinction, 42 HASTINGS L.J. 1325, 1325 (1991). Another commentator argues that
this collapse is due to the fact that "[clivil law has taken on some characteristics of
criminal law, such as its increased use of punitive damages, but more commonly
criminal law has been expanded to include what were traditionally civil violations."
Paul H. Robinson, The Criminal-Civil Distinction and the Utility of Desert, 76 B.U. L.
REV. 201, 210 (1996).
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new type of legal control." This hybrid doctrinal development is
reflected in the emerging field we have labeled "crimtorts."
Crimtorts are not a new body of law per se or even a new
cause of action. Rather, crimtorts are an explicit recognition that
the criminal law principles of punishment and deterrence have
been assimilated into tort remedies. Crimtorts have a unique
capacity simultaneously to fulfill a private function of compen-
sating injured claimants and a public law purpose of controlling
socially harmful behavior. The trend towards the absorption of
criminal law elements into torts can be seen in many recent
high profile cases. A California jury "awarded $5 billion to a
woman whose son was sexually tortured and cut to pieces by a
serial killer.""8 The Ninth Circuit upheld a $1.2 billion punitive
damages award against the estate of the former President of the
Phillippines, Ferdinand Marcos, to punish a pattern of human
rights violations. 9 Punitive damages were also awarded to the
victims of a "campaign of torture, arbitrary imprisonment and
summary executions against perceived enemies of the govern-
ment" at the hands of an Ethiopian dictatorship.2" The
congregation of a black church in South Carolina sought puni-
tive damages against alleged arsonists who burned their house
of worship as part of "the Christian Knights' practice of pro-
moting white supremacist goals through violent means."2
Each new crimtort remedy is not an anomaly to be dealt with
on an ad hoc basis. Rather, we see the growth of crimtorts as an
17. This discredited division between private and public continues to dominate
Anglo-American jurisprudence. This false dichotomy is an example of those legal doc-
trines that "we have buried, but they still rule us from their graves." FREDERIC W.
MAITLAND, THE FORMS OF ACTION AT COMMON LAw 2 (1936).
18. Mother of Serial-Killer Victim Awarded $5 Billion, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRI.,
Jan. 9, 1992, at A-33.
19. See Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 103 F.3d 767, 787 (9th Cir. 1996) (upholding
punitive damage award against the estate of Marcos).
20. See Abebej-Jira v. Negewo, 72 F.3d 844, 845 (11th Cir. 1996) (upholding
$300,000 punitive damages award for each plaintiff). The jurisdiction of the U.S. court
system may expand further: a federal judge has ruled that Unocal, a partner in a
pipeline project with the state-owned Myanmar Oil and Gas Enterprise, can be held
liable "for [human rights] abuses allegedly committed by the government of Myan-
mar." Evelyn Iritani, Unocal May Be Liable in Myanmar Case, Judge Rules, L.A.
TIMES, Apr. 17, 1997, at Al.
21. Stephane Clare, Pro Bono, AM. LAW., Sept. 1996, at 111 (quoting Tom Tur-
nipseed, the church's attorney). Punitive damages have also been sought in relation to
other racially motivated criminal acts. See Berhanu v. Metzger, 850 P.2d 373 (Or. Ct.
App. 1993) (awarding punitive damages for the act of encouraging a skinhead gang to
commit the murder of blacks); David B. Wilkins, Race, Ethics, and the First Amend-
ment: Should a Black Lawyer Represent the Ku Klux Klan?, 63 GEO. WASH. L. REv.
1030, 1051 n.107 (1995) (discussing efforts to recover punitive damages against the
Ku Klux Klan in Texas).
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evolving reconceptualization of law essential in defending
against the abuses of organizational power.22 Crimtorts are sel-
dom successfully criminally prosecuted23 despite the great
societal dangers created by corporate malfeasance.24 This Article
argues that punitive damages should be viewed as the ideal
remedy to control crimtorts because it is a civil sanction fulfill-
25ing a public purpose.
The false dichotomy between public and private law has pre-
vented legal scholars from recognizing crimtorts as a principled
method of dealing with power inequities in legal disputes. The
blending of civil and criminal law in punitive damages is at-
tacked on essentialist grounds as threatening to those "norms
linked to the rule of law"26 and because it wrongly applies
22. Crimtorts can provide a backup to public law enforcement in situations in
which government enforcement fails to adequately protect the public. For example,
the Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC) assessed a mere $5.09 million in
fines between 1980-91 against only approximately 50 companies that did not comply
with the CPSC's reporting requirements even though thousands of firms actually
failed to meet those same reporting requirements. See MICHAEL RUSTAD & THOMAS
KOENIG, PRODUCT LIABILITY PRACTICE GUIDE § 18.02(4), at 18-21 & n.32 (1993). The
total of all CPSC fines in the quarter century of its existence would be the functional
equivalent of a parking ticket to a Fortune 500 firm. The $5 billion punitive damages
award assessed against Exxon in In re The Exxon Valdez, No. A89-09-CV (D. Alaska
Sept. 16, 1994), dwarfs the totality of the CPSC's enforcement effort.
23. Corporations are skilled in resisting criminal prosecutions because of their
superior resources. See John Braithwaite, Challenging Just Deserts: Punishing White-
Collar Criminals, 73 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 723, 753-54 (1982) (arguing that the
corporate counsel exploit the various legal, accounting, organizational, and jurisdic-
tional complexities to thwart criminal prosecutions for organizational crimes). Large
criminal penalties for serious corporate misconduct are so rare that they make head-
lines. See United States v. Archer Daniels Midland Co., No. 96CR640 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 16,
1996) (assessing a $100 million-dollar criminal fine against Archer Daniels Midland
for a conspiracy to fix prices). See generally Harvey L. Pitt & Karl A. Groskaufinanis,
Minimizing Corporate Civil and Criminal Liability: A Second Look at Corporate Codes
of Conduct, 78 GEO. L.J. 1559, 1563, 1570-74 (1990) (discussing the trend toward in-
creasing employment of corporate criminal sanctions).
24. Crime in the suites poses a greater societal danger than crime in the streets.
Mass torts have the potential of endangering thousands of consumers as illustrated by
the asbestos product liability litigation. No criminal prosecutions were ever pursued
despite the widespread deaths and social dislocation attributed to the asbestos indus-
try's cover-up of the dangers from unprotected exposure. Toxic torts may endanger an
entire community's air or water supply. See generally Michael Rustad, In Defense of
Punitive Damages in Products Liability: Testing Tort Anecdotes with Empirical Data,
78 IOWA L. REV. 1 (1992).
25. The Supreme Court has recognized that punitive damages play a quasi-
criminal role in punishing conduct that may also be subject to criminal penalties. See
BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 116 S. Ct. 1589, 1598 n.22 (1996) (comparing the size of
punitive damages to civil and criminal penalties as one of the measures of excessive-
ness).
26. Kenneth S. Abraham & John C. Jeffries, Punitive Damages and the Rule of
Law: The Role of Defendant's Wealth, 18 J. LEGAL STuD. 415, 416 (1989); see also Rob-
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criminal sanctions to "fictional entities."27 This blurring of the
two spheres of law is viewed as a dangerous anomaly by some
commentators because it "invites arbitrary and discriminatory
enforcement, and violates the separation of powers principle
that has traditionally denied federal courts the power to make
common law crimes."'
Some critics propose to clarify the line between crime and tort
by changing punitive damages into a Procrustean remedy which
makes punishment the same regardless of the defendants' level
of wealth and power.29 President Clinton vetoed the Common
Sense Product Liability Legal Reform Act of 1996,' ° which would
have converted the remedy of punitive damages into a national
system of capped fines. In just such an effort, the Product Li-
ability Reform Act of 1997 proposes to separate wealth from
punitive damages calculations by limiting the remedy to the
greater of two times compensatory damages or $250,000.31
ert D. Cooter, Punitive Damages for Deterrence: When and How Much?, 40 ALA. L.
REV. 1143, 1143 (1989) (favoring the adoption of an incentive adequacy burden on
plaintiffs seeking punitive damages, thereby largely eliminating net worth calcula-
tions from punitive damages awards); Dorsey D. Ellis, Jr., Fairness and Efficiency in
the Law of Punitive Damages, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 77-78 (1982) (arguing that puni-
tive damages should only be awarded where the fault is intentional, the fault is gross
or repeated, and the damages are not being used to correct imperfections in bringing
suits or calculating damage awards); George L. Priest, Punitive Damages and Enter-
prise Liability, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 123, 124-25 (1982) (questioning the deterrent effect
of punitive damages on conduct which results in a harm); Gary T. Schwartz, Deter-
rence and Punishment in the Common Law of Punitive Damages: A Comment, 56 S.
CAL. L. REV. 133, 152 (1982) (indicating the existence of tensions between modern
cost-benefit analysis and the use of punitive damages awards).
27. See Pamela H. Bucy, Organizational Sentencing Guidelines: The Cart Before
the Horse, 71 WASH. U. L.Q. 329, 329 (1993) (noting the theoretical dilemma involved
in the criminal prosecution of a fictional corporate entity).
28. John C. Coffee, Does 'Unlawful Mean "Criminal"?: Reflections on the Disap-
pearing Tort/Crime Distinction in American Law, 71 B.U. L. REV. 193, 207 (1991).
29. In ancient Greek mythology, Procrustes waylaid travelers and forced them to
lie on an iron bed. His bed was always the right size, as the victims were "stretched or
lopped ... to fit the furniture." Anthony Harris, An EMU that Makes for Quarrelsome
Bedmates, THE TIMES, Jan. 29, 1997, at 1.
30. Common Sense Product Liability Legal Reform Act of 1996, H.R. 956, 104th
Cong. See PETER A. BELL & JEFFREY O'CONNELL, ACCIDENTAL JUSTICE: THE DI-
LEMMAS OF TORT LAW 28-29 (1997) (noting that federal product liability tort reforms
capping damages are excessively one sided); Richard B. Schmitt, Planned Veto of Li-
ability Bill is Business's Loss, WALL ST. J., Mar. 18, 1996, at A2.
31. Product Liability Reform Act of 1997, S. 648, 105th Cong. § 108. Similarly, the
American Law Institute's Reporters' Study on Enterprise Responsibility for Personal
Injury (ALI Reporters' Study) proposed the elimination of defendants' wealth from the
punitive damages equation, in favor of capped fines. Enterprise Responsibility for Per-
sonal Injury, 2 A.L.I. REP. STUDY 253, 255 (1991). The ALI Reporters' Study concluded
that "what is relevant is not the defendant's overall wealth, but rather the profit it
realized from the particular tortious activity in question." Id. at 254.
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These reforms would limit the ability of relatively powerless
individuals to redress social injustices.32 Punitive damages
would no longer be a practical option in many cases where com-
pensatory damages are low, even when the societal harm is
great. An illustration of the necessity of punitive damages to
correct power imbalances is in nursing home cases in which the
victim's nonexistent earnings and low life expectancy reduce
potential compensatory recovery to a trivial sum.s3
The expanding role of crimtorts reflects the trend towards the
civilization of the criminal law and the criminalization of the
civil law.3 While an exhaustive survey of all the dimensions of
crimtorts is beyond the scope of this Article, our focus here will
be on the most striking and controversial aspect of crimtorts:
wealth-calibrated civil punishment. The crimtort paradigm can
explain the development of hybrid sanctions such as punitive
damages, civil fines, and other forms of graduated punishment
as a functional response to America's growing social complexity
and power inequalities.
This Article recasts the interstices between criminal and tort
law as the unfolding field of crimtorts.35 Part I argues that puni-
tive damages evolved as the most efficient crimtort remedy
because of the difficulties of applying sanctions to conduct that
32. As Jonathan Kagan explains:
Because absolute caps are not linked to crucial factors such as the wealth of the
defendant or the reprehensibility of his conduct, they may over-deter some de-
fendants while under-deterring others.... An award within a $250,000 cap
might deter a local business, or even force it into bankruptcy, but it is unlikely
that this amount would affect the operating procedures of any Fortune 500
company.
Jonathan Kagan, Comment, Toward a Uniform Application of Punishment: Using the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines as a Model for Punitive Damage Reform, 40 UCLA L.
REV. 753, 780 (1993). It is important to note, however, that the Product Liability Re-
form Act of 1997 includes language addressing a defendant's egregious conduct. See S.
648 § 108(b)(3). The type of harm caused by the defendant and the defendant's finan-
cial condition are factors considered under that section. See id. § 108(b)(3)(B).
33. See Michael Rustad & Thomas Koenig, Reconceptualizing Punitive Damages
in Medical Malpractice: Targeting Amoral Corporations, Not "Amoral Monsters", 47
RUTGERS L. REV. 975, 1038-56 (1995).
34. See Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Utility of Desert, 91 NW. U, L.
REV. 453, 479 (1997) (noting with concern the trends of the criminalization of civil jaw
and civilization of criminal law).
35. Many of the procedural protections as proposed are consistent with the
Model Punitive Damages Act proposed by the National Conference of Commissioners
on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL). See MODEL PuNITIVE DAMAGES AcT (1996). The
principal purpose of NCCUSL is to promote uniformity in state laws. One of the best
known and successful NCCUSL law reform projects is the Uniform Commercial Code.
See A. Brooke Overby, Modeling UCC Drafting, 29 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 645, 651 (1996).
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is harmful, yet not clearly criminal. Part II presents empirical
research that suggests that juries are not discriminating
against corporations when awarding the standard crimtort rem-
edy, punitive damages. Instead, our study of a decade of federal
punitive damage awards of one million dollars or more against
corporate defendants demonstrates that punitive damages
awards are rare and well-controlled. Part III proposes that crim-
tort defendants receive intermediate procedural protection
halfway between the safeguards currently utilized for criminal
and tort defendants.
Determining the amount of punitive damages based on the
defendant's ability to pay appears inequitable because this Pro-
tean remedy is in tension with the dominant legal ideology of
formal equality.36 The debate over wealth-based punishment for
crimtorts reflects "the paradox of justice"37 -the long-standing
clash between America's egalitarian ideal of protecting the weak
while simultaneously advancing the inevitable inequalities pro-
duced by a market economy.
I. THE ORIGINS AND EVOLUTION OF CRIMTORTS
The rigid doctrinal distinction between tort and criminal law
is an example of the disease of "hardening of the categories."8
The separation between criminal law and tort law occurred over
centuries. At early common law, tort injuries did not give rise to
a distinct cause of action. Tort law was entirely encompassed by
36. Social scientists frequently criticize the law's assumption of formal equality
because large corporations have innumerable advantages over an individual in any
transaction. See, e.g., JAMES S. COLEMAN, THE ASYMMETRIC SOCIETY 22 (1982)
(arguing that "two parties beginning with nominally equal rights in a relation, but
coming to it with vastly different resources, end with very different actual rights in
the relation").
A recent example of product liability defendants' exercise of asymmetric power is
found in the public relations campaign mounted by firms such as Dow Corning and
the Keene Corporation in jurisdictions where they faced punitive damages litigation
in an attempt to influence public opinion in general and jurors in particular against
the plaintiffs' claims. See Richard B. Schmitt, Can Corporate Advertising Sway Ju-
ries?, WALL ST. J., Mar. 3, 1997, at B1, B3.
37. See CHARLES HANDY, THE AGE OF PARADOX 40 (1994) (discussing a paradox
between incompatible American beliefs that "those who achieve most should get most"
and 'those who need most should have their needs met").
38. See GLANVILLE WILLIAMS & B. A. HIPPLE, FOUNDATIONS OF TORT 28 (1976).
[VOL. 31:2
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the criminal aspects of the law."9 At early common law, torts
such as trespass "had a basic criminal character."'0 However,
tort law was so firmly split off from criminal law that it was
viewed as an entirely different branch of the law by the middle
of the nineteenth century. The result was that criminal law pa-
trolled conduct inimical to the public order, while tort law was
primarily concerned with rectifying the wrongs done to private
individuals.
This model had a theoretical symmetry and simplicity that
appealed to legal formalists, but was out of touch with the law-
in-action. Unlike today, class and wealth differences were openly
discussed in nineteenth-century American lawsuits. In order to
deter the privileged, wrongdoers could be punished by fines that
were based upon wealth.
In 1845, Abraham Lincoln represented a wealthy but brutal
defendant who was assessed punitive damages for an aggra-
vated assault. The Illinois Appellate Court rejected Mr. Lincoln's
argument that the wealth and power of the defendant should
not be considered by the jury, stating:
It is the policy of the law to protect the persons and prop-
erty of the poor. The consequences of an assault upon a
poor man, who has a family dependent upon his labor for
support by which he is maimed for life, are surely more se-
rious than they would be to a man in affluence. There is
nothing more abhorrent to the feelings of the citizens of a
free government than oppressing the poor and distressed
under the forms and color of, but in reality in violation of,
the law.4
References to the defendant's wealth and the plaintiff's pov-
erty were made routinely as recently as the early decades of the
twentieth century.42 Appellate judges referred repeatedly to the
39. See Dan Dobbs & Paul T. Hayden, Torts and Compensation: Personal Ac-
countability and Social Responsibility for Injury, in TEACHER'S MANUAL 1 (3d ed. 1997)
(citing S.F.C. MILSON, HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE COMMON LAW 353 (1969)).
40. W PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS, § 6, at
28 (5th ed. 1984) (observing that the action of trespass was primarily concerned with
punishment of a crime and "damages first came to be awarded incidentally to the
injured plaintiff").
41. McNamara v. King, 7 Ill. 432,434 (App. Ct. 1845) (upholding punitive damages).
42. For example, Clarence Darrow stated: "I speak for the poor, for the weak, for
the weary, for that long line of men who in darkness and despair, have borne the la-
bors of the human race." Central of Ga. R.R. Co. v. Cole, 381 S.E.2d 60, 63 (Ga. Ct.
App. 1989) (quoting Clarence Darrow). The plaintiff's counsel in another railroad case
argued that the millionaire defendant was oppressing the people and should be pun-
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social and economic inequality of the parties in lawsuits as a
justification for civil punishment." Defendants were always
provided with safeguards against the misuse of evidence of their
wealth. Plaintiff's counsel who employed references to corporate
wealth too freely in order to incite juries often had their verdicts
overturned on appeal."
A. Punitive Damages as a Reflection
of Changing Social Norms
Punitive damages were prefigured in the English doctrine of
exemplary damages.4 ' This remedy preserved social peace and
punished abuses of power.'6 From its inception, exemplary dam-
ages were based upon the enormity of the societal wrong and on
ished. See Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Crow, 107 S.W. 807, 808 (Ky. 1907). Simi-
larly, a plaintiff's counsel told a jury that he chose to make his living practicing law
"'for the naked and sick and blind in the rain and the cold,'" quoting at length from
Masefield's Consecration. Maryland Casualty Co. v. Abbott, 148 S.W.2d 465, 470 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1941, writ dism'd judgm't cor.) (dismissing objection to argument that con-
trasted defendant's wealth with plaintiff's poverty because the objection had not been
raised at trial).
43. As the New Hampshire Supreme Court ruled in 1870: "In regard to the ques-
tion of exemplary damages ... it becomes proper to inquire into the condition and
circumstances of the defendant, because ... what would be sufficient damages by way
of example and of punishment, for a day laborer, would be nothing by way either of
example or as a punishment for ... a corporation." Belknap v. Boston & Me. R.R., 49
N.H. 358, 374 (1870).
44. See, e.g., Missouri Pac. R.R. Co. v. Foreman, 107 S.W.2d 546, 546 (Ark. 1937)
(reversing award where plaintiff's counsel argued that recovery would not result in "a
meal missed" by the owners of the defendant railroad); Southern Ry Co. v. Bulleit, 82
N.E. 474, 475 (Ind. App. 1907) (reversing $2,000 award because of improper statement
that "defendant will make that much money in the time you are signing your ver-
dict"); Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Hull, 68 S.W. 433, 436 (Ky. 1902) (reversing
award because of improper comparison of the railroad's wealth to Solomon's Temple);
Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Smith, 84 S.W. 755, 757-58 (Ky. 1905) (describing
railroad as a soulless corporation that made millions of dollars every day).
45. The first English exemplary damages cases arose out of the warrantless
searches of an oppositional newspaper by government agents in the companion cases
of Huckle v. Money, 95 Eng. Rep. 768 (KB. 1763) (stating that the jury could consider
the social standing of parties in exemplary damages award), and Wilkes v. Wood, 98
Eng. Rep. 489 (KB. 1763) (awarding 1000 pounds sterling in exemplary damages to
deter government oppression).
46. Exemplary damages were generally awarded to preserve social peace. See,
e.g., Merest v. Harvey, 5 Taunt. 442 (1814) (upholding a large exemplary damages
award against a drunken aristocrat who hunted game on the plaintiff's land without
permission and shot toward the plaintiff when reproached for trespassing); see also
Forde v. Skinner, 4 C. & P. (1808) (assessing exemplary damages against a poor house
administration for shaving the head of a female pauper without justification).
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the status differentials between the plaintiff and the defendant,
as well as the plaintiff's particular injury.7
The first American punitive damages verdict was assessed
against a physician in South Carolina in 1784.48 The Wisconsin
Supreme Court in Luther v. Shaw noted that punitive damage
awards were important because the remedy "vindicates the
right of the weak, and encourages recourse to, and confidence in,
the courts of law by those wronged or oppressed."4
9
Law evolves as society changes.50 What is outrageous to the
community varies with the changing societal values that ac-
company historical development.51 Blood sports such as bull and
47. The New Hampshire Supreme Court in Fay v. Parker noted that Lord Cam-
den articulated the logic of punitive damages in Beardmore v. Carrington, 2 Wils. 244
(K.B. 1764), stating:
As to the damages, I continue of opinion that the jury are not limited to the in-
jury received. Damages are designed not only as a satisfaction to the injured
person, but likewise as a punishment to the guilty and as a proof of the detesta-
tion in which the wrong act is held by the jury
There is a historical continuity in the Court's decision in BMW of North Amer-
ica, Inc., v. Gore, 116 S. Ct. at 1599, which observed that "infliction of economic
injury.., when the target is financially unbearable, can warrant a substan-
tial penalty."
Fay v. Parker, 53 N.H. 342, 364 (1872); see also Michael Rustad & Thomas Koenig, The
Historical Continuity of Punitive Damages Awards: Reforming the Tbrt Reformers, 42
AM. U. L. REV. 1269, 1287-97 (1993) (discussing the history of exemplary and punitive
damages in England and the United States).
48. The South Carolina Supreme Court in Genay v. Norris, 1 S.C.L. (1 Bay) 6
(1784), upheld exemplary damages against a physician who caused the plaintiff
"extreme and excruciating pain" by secretly spiking his wine glass with a large dose of
cantharides (Spanish fly). See id. at 6-7. The professional standing of the physician
was mentioned in the jury instruction, which stated that "a very serious injury to the
plaintiff.., entitled him to very exemplary damages, especially from a professional
character, who could not plead ignorance of the operation and powerful effects of this
medicine." Id. at 7.
49. 147 N.W. 18, 20 (Wis. 1914); see also Gallagher v. The Yankee, 9 F. Cas. 1091,
1093 (N.D. Cal. 1859) (No. 5196) (holding master of vessel liable for exemplary dam-
ages for knowingly transporting seaman to foreign country against his will); Parrish v.
Danford, 18 F. Cas. 1231, 1233 (C.C.S.D. Ohio 1860) (No. 10,770) (upholding exemplary
damages for oppressive action of sheriff executing writ of attachment). In Brown v.
Evans, 17 F. 912 (C.C.D. Nev. 1883), the federal court noted that punitive damages
could be assessed for "'vindictive actions,' such as assault and battery, slander, libel,
seduction .... etc., where the elements of fraud, malice, gross negligence, cruelty, op-
pression, brutality, or wantonness intervene, exemplary or punitive damages may be
recovered from the defendant." Id. at 913.
50. See generally KAI T. ERIKSON, WAYWARD PURITANS (1966) (describing how the
social definitions of crime and deviance in Puritan society reflected the values and
social structure of that society).
51. See EMILE DURKHEIM, THE DIVISION OF LABOR IN SOCIETY 81 (George Simp-
son trans., Free Press of Glencoe 1964) (1893) ("[Wle must not say that an action
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bear baiting did not offend the sensibilities of the English dur-
ing the 1700s. By the first decades of the nineteenth century, the
royal cockpit at Westminster was demolished and bull and bear
baiters were prosecuted as criminals.52 The punitive damages
mechanism possesses the flexibility to defend against new social
threats as they emerge. Punitive damages have been used, for
example, to protect individuals with unpopular opinions from
the tyranny of the majority during war time.53
Moreover, the punitive damages' remedy can accommodate to
new moralities such as the changing definitions of the family. '
Punitive damages in nineteenth-century America protected the
sanctity of the family as a social unit from such external threats
shocks the common conscience because it is criminal, but rather that it is criminal
because it shocks the common conscience. We do not reprove it because it is a crime,
but it is a crime because we reprove it.").
52. See PAUL JOHNSON, THE BIRTH OF THE MODERN WORLD SOCIETY 1815-1830,
at 721 (1991).
53. In Walker v. Kellar, 218 S.W. 792, 801-02 (Tex. Civ. App. 1920), the plaintiff
was awarded punitive damages after being tarred and feathered by an anti-German
mob during World War I.
54. The nineteenth century witnessed the transition between the forms of social
control appropriate to the local community to the types needed in an impersonal and
bureaucratic mass society. In the early part of the nineteenth century, exemplary
damages were awarded to punish offenses against the family while later verdicts pro-
tected against impersonal corporate wrongdoing. Ferdinand Tonnies, the German
sociologist, explained this transition as a movement from Gemeinsehaft to Ge-
selischaft. FERDINAND TONNIES, COMMUNITY AND SOCIETY 33-34 (Charles P. Loomis
trans., Mich. State Univ. Press 1957) (1887); see also MICHAEL CROZIER, THE Bu-
REAUCRATIC PHENOMENON 1-9 (1964) (discussing the development of the concept of
bureaucracy and its various characterizations).
Fay v. Parker, 53 N.H. 342 (1872), examines a litany of nineteenth-century New
Hampshire punitive damage cases which illustrate the change from the local conflicts
characteristic of a Gemeinschaft society. The early cases centered on insults to the
family, rights to individual private property, and threats to the local community. The
emergence of railroad negligence cases in New Hampshire illustrates the movement
from small scale society to mass society. Nine categories predominated: 1) criminal
conversation, see Sanborn v. Neilson, 4 N.H. 501 (1828); 2) threat to public safety
posed by neglect of bridge, see Woodman v. Nottingham, 49 N.H. 387 (1870); Whipple v.
Walpole, 10 N.H. 130 (1839); 3) breach of promise of marriage, see Greenleaf v.
McColley, 14 N.H. 303 (1843); 4) slander, see Page v. Parker, 40 N.H. 47 (1860); Knight
v. Foster, 39 N.H. 576 (1859); Severance v. Hilton, 32 N.H. 289 (1855); Symonds v. Car-
ter, 32 N.H. 458 (1855); Merrill v. Peaslee, 17 N.H. 540 (1845); 5) seduction of servant
or family member, see Davidson v. Goodall, 18 N.H. 423 (1846); 6) trespass or unlawful
entry upon land, see Cram v. Hadley, 48 N.H. 191 (1868); Whitney v. Swett, 22 N.H. 10
(1850); Perkins v. Tawte, 43 N.H. 220 (1861); 7) wrongful attachment of personal prop-
erty, see Moore v. Bowman, 47 N.H. 494 (1867); 8) railroad negligence, see Holyoke v.
Grand Trunk Ry., 48 N.H. 541 (1869); Taylor v. Grand Trunk Ry. Co., 48 N.H. 304
(1869); Hopkins v. The Atlantic and St. Lawrence R.R., 36 N.H. 9 (1857); and 9) rail-
roads' intentional torts, see Belknap v. Boston & Me. R.R., 49 N.H. 358 (1870).
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as seduction," loss of services," and criminal conversation. 7
Familial crimtorts in the modern period generally punish op-
pression within the family, not external threats to the family
unit. Today, wives and children receive punitive damages for
familial sexual abuse" and other torts by family members."
Crimtorts continue to expand to further protect individuals
from brutality. However, the most controversial extension of pu-
nitive damages lies in their increasing use for the social control
of abusive organizations. By the 1850s, punitive damages pun-
ished reckless conduct by common carriers.6 Railroads became
habitual defendants in cases involving the negligent mainte-
nance of tracks, reckless operation of trains, and intentional
wrongdoing by employees,6 1 and, by the 1870s, wealth-based
55. Many seduction cases punished wealthy males who victimized servants or
other subordinates. See, e.g., Drobnich v. Bach, 198 N.W. 669, 670 (Minn. 1924)
(upholding a $9,000 award against a rich defendant for breach of promise to marry
plaintiff); Goodal v. Thurman, 38 Tenn. (1 Head) 209 (1858) (assessing punitive dam-
ages against a wealthy male for seduction of a servant); Owens v. Fanning, 205 S.W.
69, 72 (Mo. Ct. App. 1918) (awarding punitive damages against a wealthy man for
seducing a 17-year-old girl).
56. Loss of services was frequently mentioned as the sine qua non of torts
against the family. See, e.g., Berghammer v. Mayer, 207 N.W. 289 (Wis. 1926)
(awarding punitive damages to father of 15-year-old seduction victim); Reutkemeier v.
Nolte, 161 N.W. 290 (Iowa 1917) (awarding $6,000 punitive damages to father of im-
pregnated 14-year-old girl).
57. See, e.g., Sanborn v. Neilson, 4 N.H. 501, 504, 511 (1828) (affirming punitive
damages verdict for criminal conversation with plaintiff's wife based in part on the
type of conduct undertaken by defendant).
58. See, e.g., Parsons v. McRoberts, 463 N.E.2d 1049, 1050 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984)
(affirming $12,000 punitive damages award against stepfather for sexually assaulting
stepdaughter); Laurie Marie M. v. Jeffrey T.M., 559 N.Y.S.2d 336, 342 (App. Div. 1990)
(reducing $275,000 punitive damages award to $100,000 in case where defendant was
charged with sexually touching 11-year-old stepdaughter). See generally Jocelyn B.
Lamm, Note, Easing Access to the Courts for Incest Victims: Toward an Equitable Ap-
plication of the Delayed Discovery Rule, 100 YALE L.J. 2189 (1991).
59. In Caron v. Caron, 577 A.2d 1178 (Me. 1990), an ex-wife and her son obtained
$110,000 in punitive damages from her former husband as the result of physical and
psychological abuse.
60. Vicarious punitive liability for the reckless acts of agents was well estab-
lished by the 1850s. The Iowa Supreme Court upheld a punitive damages award
against a stage coach company for employing a known drunkard as a driver in Frink
& Co. v. Coe, 4 Greene 555, 560 (Iowa 1854). See also Peck v. Neil, 19 F. Cas. 79 (D.
Ohio 1842) (No. 10,892) (ruling that stage coach company was liable for exemplary
damages based upon recklessness of driver).
61. See, e.g., Maysville & Lexington R.R. Co. v. Herrick, 76 Ky. 122, 127 (1877)
(assessing punitive damage for railroad's gross negligence); see also Texas Trunk Ry.
Co. v. Johnson, 12 S.W. 482 (Tex. 1889) (upholding exemplary damages award arising
out of train derailment caused by excessive speed on rotten tracks); McFee v. Vicks-
burg, 7 So. 720 (La. 1890) (assessing punitive damages for "running its trains over an
unsafe and dangerous track, the necessary repairs to which were delayed, although
304 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 31:2
punitive damages against corporations for threats to the public
safety was well established by the 1870s.
6 2
B. The Contemporary Debate over Wealth and Punishment
The contemporary critics of wealth-calibrated punishment
argue that since the "wealthy defendant derives no greater
benefit than a poor defendant, then both will be equally de-
terred (or equally undeterred) by the threat of [compensatory]
tort liability."' Another critic asserts that: "The 'Wealth of the
defendant' bears no obvious relationship to deterrence goals: If
the diminishing utility of money reduces the rich defendant's
'real' liability costs, it equally reduces the risk-prevention costs
the defendant would need to incur."" Although such assertions
are theoretically elegant, they defy common sense.
Fixed fines reduce a defendant's calculus to a question of
long-term profit balanced against the cost of doing business.
Trucks of a major package delivery service casually ignore the
parking regulations of Boston's Beacon Hill, treating the re-
sulting tickets as a cost of doing business. Punitive damages
against this firm would not be appropriate because no signifi-
cant social harm results from their lackadaisical parking
practices. However, if these delivery vans created a real risk to
the public by blocking access for ambulances and fire trucks,
punitive damages might be employed to optimally raise the
price of wrongdoing.
Wealth is a necessary ingredient in the punitive damages
equation because of the enormous power of America's giant cor-
porations.65 As Justice Louis Brandeis warned:
the dangerous condition and consequent peril to. the safety and lives of its employees
and the public were well known to the managers of the company").
62. See, e.g., Goddard v. Grand Trunk Ry., 57 Me. 222 (1869) (noting that "every
candid-minded person must admit that [punitive damages] against a corporation is no
new doctrine").
63. Abraham & Jeffries, supra note 26, at 417
64. Schwartz, supra note 26, at 140.
65. Berle and Means described the growing societal power of America's largest
corporations in their classic 1932 study of management control:
[A] society in which production is governed by blind economic forces is being
replaced by one in which production is carried on under the ultimate control of
a handful of individuals. The economic power in the hands of the few persons
who control a giant corporation is a tremendous force which can harm or bene-
fit a multitude of individuals, affect whole districts, skirt the currents of trade,
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Through size, corporations, once merely an efficient tool
employed by individuals in the conduct of private busi-
ness, have become an institution-an institution which
has brought such concentration of economic power that
so-called private corporations are sometimes able to
dominate the State.6
Organizational deviance by private corporations is an increasing
danger to our collective welfare in the information age.
II. TOWARD A CRIMTORT PARADIGM
A. A Crimtort Paradigm
The deep divisions over the propriety of punitive damages are
the teething pains of the emergent paradigm of crimtorts. The
development of a new paradigm is "regularly marked by fre-
quent and deep debates over legitimate methods, problems, and
standards of solution.' Criminal law is "drowning in a sea of
torts,"' as illustrated by such statutes as the Racketeer Influ-
enced and Corrupt Organization Act (RICO), 9 the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA),7 anti-insider trader
statutes," and the False Claims Act."2 Wealth-based civil pun-ishment is also employed in section 1983 constitutional tort
bring ruin to one community and prosperity to another. The organizations
which they control have passed far beyond the realm of private enterprise-
they have become more nearly social institutions.
ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE
PROPERTY 46 (rev. ed. 1968).
66. Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 565 (1933) (Brandeis, J., dissent-
ing).
67. THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 47-48 (3rd
ed. 1996) (developing the theory of scientific progress through paradigm shifts).
68. GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACTS 87 (1994) (coining expression).
69. RICO permits private lawsuits against corrupt organizations. Claimants may
receive treble damages for exposing wrongdoing detrimental to the public interest.
See 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1997).
70. RCRA authorizes private citizens to file lawsuits to protect the environment.
Courts may award attorney fees and the costs of expert witnesses to encourage the
exposure of wrongdoing. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-92 (1997).
71. See Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989
(FIRREA), Pub. L. No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183 (1989).
72. 31 U.S.C. § 3729 (1997).
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actions,73 civil forfeiture litigation,74 antitrust enforcement,7 5 sex-
ual harassment remedies,76 and whistleblower qui tam actions.7
The rapid expansion of graduated punishment to deter or-
ganizational malfeasance is emblematic of the increasingly
indistinct boundaries between public and private law.7s As Jus-
tice Sandra Day O'Connor observed in her dissent in Pacific
Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Haslip, "the civil/criminal distinc-
tion is blurry. Unlike compensatory damages, which are purely
civil in character, punitive damages are by definition punish-
ment. They operate as 'private fines levied by civil juries' to
advance governmental objectives."79
The cutting edge of crimtorts is the expanded use of pro-
gressive punitive sanctions against corporations.' The use of
73. See Michael Wells, Punitive Damages for Constitutional Torts, 56 LA. L. REV.
841, 841 n.2 (1996) (stating that punitive damages are available for citizen suits
seeking redress for "constitutional violations committed by state officers and other
persons acting 'under color of state law").
74. See Mary M. Cheh, Constitutional Limits on Using Civil Remedies to Achieve
Criminal Law Objectives: Understanding and Transcending the Criminal-Civil Law
Distinction, 42 HASTINGS L.J. 1325, 1326 n.4 (1991) (noting that there are "[o]ver 100
federal forfeiture statutes ... currently in effect, covering the seizure of goods and
property and encompassing a wide range of activities"). See generally Donald J. Bou-
dreaux & A.C. Pritchard, Civil Forfeiture and the War on Drugs: Lessons from
Economics and History, 33 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 79 (1996); Michael J. Munn, The After-
math of Austin v. United States: When is Civil Forfeiture an Excessive Fine?, 1994
UTAH L. REv. 1255.
75. Dual governmental and private enforcement is provided for in the Sherman
Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (1997), the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1997), and the Robinson-
Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13-13b (1997).
76. See, e.g., Michael J. Phillips, Employer Sexual Harassment Liability Under
Agency Principles: A Second Look at Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 44 VAND.
L. REV. 1229, 1232 n.11 (1991) (referring to congressional moves to allow punitive
damages for Title VII actions).
77. A qui tam action is a "civil action that requires the underlying conduct to be
considered criminal.... In a qui tam action, the plaintiff pays the litigation costs and
shares in any penalties that are awarded." Michael W. Carroll, When Congress Just
Says No: Deterrence Theory and the Inadequate Enforcement of the Federal Election
Campaign Act, 84 GEO. L.J. 551, 585 (1996). See generally William E. Kovacic, Whis-
tleblower Bounty Lawsuits as Monitoring Devices in Government Contracting, 29 LOY.
L.A. L. REV. 1799 (1996) (describing the use of financial incentives to encourage civil
lawsuits initiated by whistleblowers).
78. Many scholars have commented on the merging of criminal and civil law. See,
e.g., Coffee, supra note 28, at 193; John C. Coffee, Jr., Paradigms Lost: The Blurring of
the Criminal and Civil Law Models-And What Can Be Done About It, 101 YALE L.J.
1875 (1992); Abraham S. Goldstein, White-Collar Crime and Civil Sanctions, 101 YALE
L.J. 1895 (1992); Kenneth Mann, Punitive Civil Sanctions: The Middleground Between
Criminal and Civil Law, 101 YALE L.J. 1795 (1992); Robinson & Darley, supra note 34,
at 479-82.
79. 499 U.S. 1, 47-48 (1991) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc., 418 US. 323, 350 (1974)).
80. See Mann, supra note 78, at 1795. See generally Coffee, supra note 28, at 193.
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wealth in setting punishment is the most controversial fea-
ture of modern civil punishment."1 The bitter struggle over
punitive damages pits plaintiffs' lawyers against the defense
bar and consumer advocates against corporatists. We propose
a cease-fire and a cooperative effort to clarify the remedy
without destroying its deterrent power. The moral credibility
of crimtorts depends upon recognizing procedural and insti-
tutional reforms which reflect its doctrinal status halfway
between criminal and civil law.2 Table One below depicts our
preliminary thoughts on the major dimensions of this emer-
gent paradigm.
81. One plaintiff's lawyer argues that the elimination of facts about net worth
would '[cihange the nature of punitive damages ... more into the nature of insignifi-
cant fines." Mike McKee, Concealing the Company Assets, LEGAL TIMES, Apr. 3, 1995,
at 5 (quoting Dan Bolton, San Francisco plaintiff's attorney).
A former American Trial Lawyers of America President defends the present system,
arguing that if the "jurors in the Exxon Valdez oil-spill case had hit the Exxon Corp. with
$1 million in punitive damages instead of $5 billion, as they did, the multi-national com-
pany would have 'laughed at it.'" McKee, supra at 5 (quoting Larry Stewart, plaintiff's
attorney with Miami law firm of Stewart, Tilghman, Fox & Bianchi).
Numerous business interests have combined in every state to limit the remedy of
punitive damages. This issue remains a top legislative priority for much of the corpo-
rate community. See Sally Roberts, 7brt Reform Issues Top Risk Managers' Concerns:
Survey, Bus. INS., Apr. 15, 1996, at 29 (reporting that for the eighth year in a row, caps
on noneconomic and punitive damages are the most important of several tort reform
issues to corporate risk managers).
The Contract with America advocated capping punitive damages in product liability:
It is news to no one that juries have been out of control over the past decade in
awarding punitive damages far in excess of what is required to make a plaintiff
whole. Part of the blame is to rest on the system, because it gives juries very lit-
tle guidance with which to make such awards.
CONTRACT WITH AMERICA: THE BOLD PLAN BY REP. NEWT GINGRICH, REP. DICK ARMEY,
AND THE HOUSE REPUBLICANS TO CHANGE THE NATION 147 (Ed Gillespie & Bob
Schellhas eds., 1994) (advocating the Common Sense Legal Reforms Act which would
limit punitive damages to the greater of three times the economic damages or
$250,000).
82. See Robinson & Darley, supra note 34, at 478 (arguing that "the law's moral
credibility also may depend upon procedural and institutional reforms").
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TABLE ONE:
KEY DIMENSIONS OF CRIMTORTS, CRIMES, AND TORTS
PREDOMINANT CRIMTORT CRIME TORT
FEATURE
Social Private & Public-Order Private-
Functions Public- Control Restitution
Exemplary
Culpability Middle Range: States of Mind: Intentional,
Standard i.e., Reckless From Malice to Negligence, and
Disregard Strict Liability Strict Liability
Examples of Proof by Clear Proof Beyond a Proof by
Procedural and Convincing Reasonable Preponderance
Protection Evidence Doubt of the Evidence
Use of Wealth Wealth- Wealth is Wealth is
Calibrated Inadmissible Inadmissible
B. Contorts as a Subcategory of Crimtorts
The disintegration of the boundary between crime and tort
parallels the merging of the laws of contract and tort. Many
"contorts" are actually crimtorts in disguise, controlling conduct
inimical to the general welfare through wealth-calibrated civil
punishment.' Punitive damages are assessed for "contorts"
when there is an independent tort flowing from an egregious
breach of contract." The extension of tort law into contract law5
83. See GILMORE, supra note 68, at 90 (proposing that the first-year law school
curriculum merge the subjects of contracts and torts into "contorts').
84. "Punitive damages are not recoverable for a breach of contract unless the
conduct constituting the breach is also a tort for which punitive damages are recover-
able." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 355 (1981). Only California permitted
punitive damages in purely commercial contracts not involving a special relationship
between the contracting parties. See Seaman's Direct Buying Serv. v. Standard Oil Co.,
686 P.2d 1158 (Cal. 1984). Recently, California has reversed course and rejected the
expansion of punitive contort liability in the purely commercial context. See Freeman
& Mills, Inc. v. Belcher Oil Co., 900 P.2d 669, 679-80 (Cal. 1995) (overruling Seaman's
Direct Buying Service).
85. Punitive damages are not available in a purely contractual case. However,
courts employ the legal fiction of an independent tort to permit the claimant to receive
punitive damages. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 355 (1981). The inde-
pendent torts of fraud, interference with contractual relations, and intentional
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arises chiefly where there is a significant imbalance of power
and information in the contractual relationship."
Contorts are typically used as counterweapons against
stronger contractual parties who abuse some special duty owed
to the weaker party. An insurer's refusal to pay a valid claim is
a breach of contract but it may also constitute an independent
tort warranting punitive damages. 7 When a firm "chisels" small
amounts from each member of a large group, it is unlikely that
any individual will go to court." Table Two depicts the four most
common punitive contorts.
infliction of emotional distress are frequently employed to obtain punitive damages in
a contracts case.
86. Churning of a customer's accounts is a typical example of the misuse of
asymmetrical knowledge which can lead to punitive damages. See Deborah Travis,
Comment, Broker Churning: Who Is Punished? Vicariously Assessed Punitive Dam-
ages in the Context of Brokerage Houses and Their Agents, 30 HOUS. L. REV. 1775
(1993).
87. The classic example of asymmetric information is the relationship of insurer
and insured. Courts frequently note that insurers owe a higher duty to the insured
because of their superior bargaining power. See Grand Sheet Metal Prod. Co. v. Pro-
tection Mut. Ins. Co., 375 A-2d 428, 430 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1977); White v. Unigard Mut.
Ins. Co., 730 P.2d 1014, 1019 (Idaho 1986). The court in Egan v. Mutual of Omaha
Insurance Co., 620 P.2d 141 (Cal. 1979), upheld punitive damages against a disability
insurer who failed to properly investigate a policyholder's claim by having him exam-
ined by the physician. The court stated that "the relationship of insurer and insured is
inherently unbalanced; the adhesive nature of insurance contracts places the insurer
in a superior bargaining position. The availability of punitive damages is thus com-
patible with recognition of insurers' underlying public obligations and reflects an
attempt to restore balance in the contractual relationship." Id. at 146.
88. Punitive damages were assessed against an insurance company that taught
its adjusters to chisel payments on claims because policyholders were unlikely to dis-
cover or strenuously object to such petty losses. See Hawkins v. Allstate Ins. Co., 733
P.2d 1073 (Ariz. 1987); see also Moore v. American United Life Ins. Co., 197 Cal. Rptr.
878 (Ct. App. 1984) (upholding punitive damages against company engaged in a bad
faith failure-to-investigate-claims scheme); Eckenrode v. Life of Am. Ins. Co., 470 F.2d
1 (7th Cir. 1972) (upholding award against life insurer for its practice of using
"economic coercion" to "compromise" valid claims); Delos v. Farmers Ins. Group, Inc.,
155 Cal. Rptr. 843, 857 (Ct. App. 1979) (affirming award against insurer for "nefarious
scheme to mislead and defraud thousands of policyholders").
In energy producing states, such as Texas or Oklahoma, there is a great potential
for abuse because royalty owners are often uneducated and unfamiliar with the legal-
ese in complex oil and gas contracts. Chiseling may take the form of a producer
systematically underpaying royalties or concealing excessive charges. The typical
royalty owner will defer to the producer's "expertise" as to what constitutes a valid
payout because of a disparity in information.
Farmers selling to large scale wholesalers are another group that is particularly
vulnerable to chiseling by powerful corporations. In Braswell v. ConAgra, Inc., 936
F.2d 1169 (11th Cir. 1991), 268 Alabama chicken raisers received a $9.1 million puni-
tive damages award against a firm which systematically underweighed chickens,
causing small losses to numerous farmers. In the absence of punitive damages, no
single farmer would find it worthwhile to prosecute his small claim. See also Hultein
v. Meilman Food Indus., Inc., 293 N.W.2d 889 (S.D. 1980) (upholding $50,000 punitive
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TABLE TWO: CONTORTS AS CIVIL PUNISHMENT
SPECIFIC CONTRACTUAL TYPES OF
CONTRACTS RELATIONSHIP WRONGDOING




Lender Liability Duty to Disclose Common Law
Information; Fraud; Lender
Fiduciary Duty Liability; Bad
Faith Torts; Breach
of Loan Contract
Business Contracts No Special Bad Faith Breach
Relationship of Contract
Employment Decline of At-Will Bad Faith
Relationships Rule; No Special Terminations
Relationship I _I
Two insurance punitive contorts were upheld by the Supreme
Court during the past decade."9 In Pacific Mutual Life Insurance
Co. v. Haslip," an insurance company refused to pay the hospi-
tal bills of a poor woman because an agent had absconded with
her premium payments. The Supreme Court upheld a punitive
damages award against the insurance company, finding the firm
liable for the intentional fraud of its agent.
damages award against a meat packing plant that systematically cheated ranchers by
misgrading meat). It is rare for this type of wrongdoing to be uncovered by public
regulators. But see Scott Kilman, ConAgra Pleads Guilty to Fraud in Grain Case,
WALL ST. J., March 20, 1997, at B12 (reporting that ConAgra recently agreed to pay
$8.3 million in criminal penalties to settle fraud charges for systematically cheating
Indiana farmers by spraying water on grain to make it heavier); Boise Dodge v. Clark,
453 P.2d 551, 558 (Idaho 1969) (upholding punitive award of 36 times compensatory
award in odometer rollback case on grounds that few purchasers would discover the
illegal conduct); FDIC v. W.R. Grace & Co., 877 F.2d 614, 623 (7th Cir. 1989) ("The
most straightforward rationale for punitive damages ... is that they are necessary to
deter torts or crimes that are concealable."). See generally Walker v. Sheldon, 179
N.E.2d 497, 499-500 (N.Y. 1961) (upholding punitive damages award for fraud).
89. See Bankers Life & Cas. Co. v. Crenshaw, 486 US. 71 (1988) (affirming puni-
tive damages award arising out of bad-faith denial of insurance claim); Pacific Mut.
Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1 (1991) (same).
90. 499 US. 1, 6-7 (1991) (upholding an award which included compensatory
damages and punitive damages of more than $1 million).
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Another rapidly growing punitive contort is lender liability, a
field which gave rise to many multi-million dollar punitive
damage awards during the 1980s.9' A number of large punitive
damage awards have also been assessed for toxic spills.92 Busi-
ness contract awards are currently the fastest growing punitive
contort.93 Predatory and unfair business tactics have resulted in
a number of the largest punitive damages awards. ' Terminated
or disgruntled employees have employed punitive damages to
redress wrongful terminations, sexual harassment, and other
employment torts. An eighty million dollar punitive damages
award was assessed against Triton Energy Corporation for ter-
minating an employee who refused to participate in preparing a
fraudulent 10-K filing for his employer.95
The rise of contorts is another example of the disintegrating
boundaries between private and public law. The debate over pu-
nitive damages has been deeply confused and misdirected by
the failure to develop a general theory of contorts. The rise of
this new body of crimtort law shows that Prosser was right; the
interests of society are increasingly involved in private tort liti-
gation.96
91. See, e.g., K.M.C. Co. v. Irving Trust Co., 757 F.2d 752 (6th Cir. 1985)
(upholding $7.5 million punitive damages award in lender liability action); Penthouse
Int'l, Ltd. v. Dominion Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 665 F. Supp. 301 (S.D.N.Y 1987), modi-
fled, 885 F.2d 963 (2d Cir. 1988) (awarding $130,000,000 damages in lender liability
action).
92. See Pamela Coyle, Tort Reform Advocates See $3.4 Bilion Award as Evidence
of Sick Systems, 83 A-B.A. J. 38 (Nov. 1997) (reporting a $2.5 billion punitive damage
jury award against five companies for neighborhood evacuations due to New Orleans
chemical fire).
93. RAND's Institute of Civil Justice found punitive damages in business con-
tract cases to have increased greatly between 1960 and 1984. See MARK PETERSON ET
AL., INSTITUTE FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, RAND, PuNIivE DAMAGES: EMPIRICAL FINDINGS
22-25 (1987).
94. See, e.g., Texaco, Inc. v. Penzoil Co., 784 F.2d 1133 (2d Cir. 1986), rev'd in part,
481 U.S. 1 (1987) (upholding three billion dollars in punitive damages and seven and a
half billion dollars in compensatory damages in business torts case); Dominquez En-
ergy L.P. v. Shell Oil Co., No. C736 891 (L.A. Cen. Civ. W., Cal., Jan. 11, 1994)
(awarding $173 million in real estate fraud case involving environmental contamina-
tion); $137 Million Fraud Verdict, NA'L L.J., Apr. 20, 1992, at 19 (reporting $134
million punitive award in fraudulent brokerage case ContiCommodity Servs Inc. v.
Prescott, Ball & Turben, NAT'L L.J., Jan. 25, 1993, at S-14 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.,
Apr. 6, 1992)); Zachariades v. Smith & Nephew Richards, No. 336,999 (San Mateo,
Cal., 1993) (reported in California Jury Verdicts & Settlement Reports, LEXIS)
(awarding $19 million in business torts and misappropriation of trade secrets case).
95. See Janacek v. Triton Energy Corp., No. 90-7220 (Dallas, Tex., Dist. Ct., May
1992).
96. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 40, § 3, at 15.
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C. Social Functions of Crimtort Remedies
During the past quarter century, civil punishment of corpora-
tions has been institutionalized in the form of statutory
multiple damages and punitive damages. Punitive crimtort
remedies deter reprehensible conduct that, although arguably
rational from the economic standpoint of the particular tortfea-
sor, has devastating social costs for consumers and for society.
Crimtort penalties are useful in punishing impermissible cost-
benefit calculations which trade consumer safety for profits.'
In Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co.,98 the cost of fixing the dan-
gerously defective fuel system in Pinto automobiles would have
been $137 million." Ford estimated that the 180 burn deaths,
180 serious burn injuries, and 2,100 destroyed vehicles that
would result from the failure to recall the Pintos would cost the
company only $49.5 million."w The jury awarded punitive dam-
ages, finding that Ford sacrificed consumer interests in favor of
97. The practical difficulties in prosecuting crimtorts on the criminal side of the
law include the complex issues of cause-in-fact, the stringent procedural and eviden-
tiary standard of beyond a reasonable doubt, and the more demanding procedural and
evidentiary rules required under criminal law. See Jordan H. Leibman, Fatal Subtrac-
tion: The Inside Story of Buchwald v. Paramount, 31 BuS. L.J. 535, 535 (1993) (noting
that the Pinto litigation illustrated the difficulties of using criminal law against cor-
porations); see also Francis T. Cullen et al., The Ford Pinto Case and Beyond: Moral
Boundaries and the Criminal Sanction, in WHITE-COLLAR CRIME: CLASSIC AND
CONTEMPORARY VIEwS 280, 287-94 (Gilbert Geis et al. eds., 1995) (discussing the diffi-
culties in prosecuting Ford).
98. 174 Cal. Rptr. 348 (Ct. App. 1981). The decision to expose consumers to such
a risk was based on an unethical "cost-benefit analysis" that balanced egregiously
undervalued "human lives and limbs against corporate profit." Id. at 384. Profit
maximizers must know that the worst case scenario is more serious than merely
paying only what was owed in the first place plus legal expenses. In the calculation of
the defendant's expected profits, the wrongdoer is likely to allow for a certain amount
of money which will have to be returned to those victims who object too vigorously.
The firm will be perfectly content to bear the additional cost of litigation as the price
for continuing its illicit business conduct. See also William Whitford, Structuring Con-
sumer Protection Legislation to Maximize Effectiveness, 1981 Wis. L. REV. 1018, 1026
(examining the economics of corporate deterrence); cf David Owen, Problems in As-
sessing Punitive Damages Against Manufacturers of Defective Products, 49 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1, 17 n.83 (1982) (arguing that cost-benefit analysis is a necessary corporate
practice that juries misunderstand which leads to unjust punitive damage awards).
99. See Dennis A. Gioia, Why I Didn't Recognize Pinto Fire Hazards: How Organ-
izational Scripts Channel Managers' Thoughts and Actions, in CORPORATE AND
GOVERNMENTAL DEVIANCE: PROBLEMS OF ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR IN CON-
TEMPORARY SOCIETY 139, 142-43 (M. David Ermann & Richard J. Lundman eds., 5th
ed. 1996) (presenting an account of Ford's decision not to recall the Pinto by Ford's
recall coordinator).
100. See id.
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its own bottom line. Punitive damages punished Ford. The
criminal law did not. 1' The Grimshaw jury awarded $125 mil-
lion in punitive damages, reduced by the trial judge to $3.5
million."° The punitive damages stung, but did not bankrupt,
Ford Motor Company.
The Ford Pinto litigation produced the only case in American
history in which a corporation was criminally prosecuted for
knowingly marketing a dangerously defective product.'03 In
August of 1978, three teenage girls died from burns when their
1973 Pinto was struck from behind and burst into flames. An
Indiana prosecutor charged Ford with three counts of reckless
homicide,' °4 but Ford's acquittal on these criminal charges has
discouraged other prosecutors from using the criminal law to
punish reckless manufacturers. 5
The criminal law also proved inadequate to protect the public
interest in punishing the massive fraud that led to the collapse
of the savings and loan industry in the 1980s. One in six savings
and loan firms became insolvent because of unbridled greed
coupled with risky investment decisions.'0 6 Although the
101. Under California law, the maximum criminal penalty for marketing a defec-
tive vehicle would have been $1,000, an amount dwarfed by Ford's net worth of $7.7
billion and its after-tax income after taxes of $983 million. See Grimshaw, 174 Cal.
Rptr. at 396.
102. See id. at 358.
103. See David T. Friendly, Ford's Pinto: Not Guilty, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 24, 1980, at
74.
104. See Cullen et al., supra note 97, at 280, 284 (noting that the State's Attorney
General Michael Consentino brought charges under section 35-42-1-5 of the Indiana
Code, which states that "[a] person who recklessly kills another human being commits
reckless homicide").
105. In a post-verdict interview, Ford's attorney stated that he hoped "Ford's ac-
quittal would deter other prosecutors from bringing similar criminal charges against
corporations." Karen Clem Fritz, Pinto Jury Votes Acquittal, WASH. POST, Mar. 14,
1980, at A-1. His hope has been realized. One of the reasons that criminal law is so
ineffectual in prosecuting crimtorts is that corporate defendants hire teams of former
white collar prosecutors to defend against these actions. Most elite defense firms are
staffed with former prosecutors who are knowledgeable about the internal workings of
federal and state law enforcement agencies. For example, the home page of the Chi-
cago law firm of McDermott, Will and Emery is one of many that advertises that the
partnership has "extensive experience handling white-collar criminal matters....
Many of the attorneys in the Litigation Department have served as federal prosecu-
tors, an experience which provides them with a unique perspective to counsel and
advise clients." McDermott, Will & Emery Home Page (visited Nov. 21, 1997)
<http://www.mwe.com/area/lit-whit.html> (on file with the University of Michigan
Journal of Law Reform). See generally KENNETH MANN, DEFENDING WHrTE COLLAR
CRIME: A PORTRArr OF ATTORNEYS AT WORK 21 (1985) (discussing trend of federal
prosecutors joining white collar crime defense bar).
106. See ROBERT F. HARTLEY, MANAGEMENT MISTAKES AND SUCCESSES 213 (4th
ed. 1994).
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"financial losses incurred in the savings and loan crisis [were]
due in no small part to deliberate criminal activity,"1 7 few indi-
vidual or corporate defendants were prosecuted.10
Punitive damages uncovered and punished a pattern of fraud
that was previously undetected by weak public regulators."°
When it was shown that thousands of customers of Lincoln
Savings and Loan Association were steered toward high-
yielding junk bonds with the false promise that the bonds were
guaranteed against default, a $410 million punitive damage
award was assessed for this systematic defrauding." 0
1. Punishment and Specific Deterrence-Wealth-sensitive
crimtort remedies such as punitive damages, civil fines, statu-
tory multiple damages, and, to a lesser extent, criminal fines,
can teach even the most influential organizations that "tort does
not pay." "' Corporate wrongdoing too often goes unpunished be-
cause of the limited resources and expertise of public prosecutors
107. Henry N. Pontell & Kitty Calavita, The Savings and Loan Industry, in
BEYOND THE LAW: CRIME IN COMPLEX ORGANIZATIONS 203, 240 (Michael Tonry & Al-
bert J. Reiss, Jr. eds., 1993) (reporting that "fraud in savings and loan (S&L)
institutions may constitute the most costly set of white-collar crimes in history").
108. See Kitty Calavita & Henry T. Pontell, Heads I Win, Tails You Lose: Deregula-
tion, Crime, and Crisis in the Savings and Loan Industry, in WHITE-COLLAR CRIME:
CLASSIC AND CONTEMPORARY VIEWS, supra note 97, at 200 (discussing causes of gov-
ernment's failure to use the criminal law against savings and loan executives).
109. See DAVID 0. FRIEDRICHS, TRUSTED CRIMINAlS: WHITE COLLAR CRIME IN
CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY 164 (1996) (stating that, even when the government prose-
cuted, "[bly the Justice Department's own guidelines, the appropriate jail time for
these crimes was less than that imposed for conventional bank robbery, and the fines
imposed were less than the total amount stolen") (citation omitted).
110. See Shields v. Keating (In re American Continental Corp./Lincoln Say. &
Loan Sec. Litig.), No. 93-15131, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 13184 (9th Cir. May 23, 1994)
(upholding $410 million punitive damages award for violations of federal securities
laws, RICO, and fraud). The prosecution of this staggering crime resulted in one of the
few criminal convictions. In 1990, Charles Keating was sentenced to ten years in
prison for defrauding these customers. In 1993, he was convicted on another 73 crimi-
nal counts. See FRIEDRICHS, supra note 109, at 162-64 (noting that "[miost of those
convicted in S & L cases were minor players, and in many of the cases involving losses
of millions in the dollars, only probation and relatively modest fines were imposed")
(citation omitted).
The criminal law did not provide any redress to the tens of thousands of victims of
savings and loan fraud. Big Eight accounting firms and several of America's most
prestigious law firms agreed to pay punitive damages for their participation in this
scandal. The accounting firm of Arthur Andersen settled the claims against it for $30
million. The New York law firm of Kaye, Scholer, Fierman, Hays & Handler paid $20
million. The Chicago law firm of Sidley & Austin settled its punitive liability for $35
million. Drexel Burnham Lambert and Michael E. Milliken agreed to pay $80 million.
See In re American Continental CorplLincoln Sav. & Loan Sec. Litig., MDL Docket
No. 834 (D. Ariz. 1992).
111. See Rookes v. Bernard, 1 All E.R. 367 (H.L. 1964).
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and the great power of large companies."' However, crimtorts
send a message to even the wealthiest organizations that they
may not abuse the public trust.1 3 Civil punishment is especially
appropriate when a firm demonstrates its unwillingness to obey
social norms and is undeterred by fixed criminal fines or penal-
ties." 4 Crimtorts are optimally used to punish and deter
wrongdoers where the probability of detection is very low and
the probability of harm is very high."5 The price of wrongdoing
must significantly exceed the gain in order not to provide the
wrongdoer with a competitive advantage."6
2. The Social Message of General Deterrence-Punitive sanc-
tions signal to the entire community that certain socially
harmful behaviors will not be tolerated."7 Deterrence depends
upon certain and severe punishment following violations of the
social order. Civil punishment expresses societal disapproval by
ratcheting up the price of wrongdoing 8 and has been described
as "a sort of hybrid between a display of ethical indignation and
the imposition of a criminal fine.""' The message of punitive
damages is "teaching the defendant not to do it again, and of
deterring others from following the defendant's example."2'
112. See Peter Cleary Yeager, Industrial Water Pollution, in BEYOND THE LAW:
CRIME IN COMPLEX ORGANIZATIONS, supra note 107, at 97, 130 (arguing that enforce-
ment efforts are rarely directed at large corporations because officials are afraid of the
resistance of large corporations).
113. See FRIEDRICHS, supra note 109, at 12.
114. See generally BRENT FISSE & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, CORPORATIONS, CRIME AND
ACCOUNTABILITY 86 (1993) (arguing that wide range of sanctions is necessary to main-
tain corporate accountability).
115. See WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE
OF TORT LAw 160-63 (1987).
116. See POSNER supra note 13, at 54 (arguing that when costs of prosecution and
the difficulty of detection are high, punitive damages are particularly efficient).
117. In Browning-Ferris Indus., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257 (1989), a
national waste disposal firm attempted to gain a competitive edge over a smaller rival
by "fs]quish[ing] him like a bug." Id. at 260. The jury's $6 million dollar punitive dam-
ages award is designed to deter the business community from employing such tactics.
The $10 million punitive damages award affirmed by the Supreme Court in TXO
Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 509 U.S. 443 (1993), was based upon the actual
and potential harm of the defendant's course of conduct, the degree of bad faith dis-
played by the defendant, and whether the conduct was part of a "larger pattern of
fraud, trickery and deceit." Id. at 462. The $10 million punitive award was a message
not only to TXO, but to the entire oil and gas industry, not to engage in predatory
business practices.
118. The Supreme Court of Indiana stated that the "sole issues [in awarding puni-
tive damages] are whether or not the Defendant's conduct was so obdurate that he
should be punished for the benefit of the general public." Orkin Exterminating Co. v.
Traina, 486 N.E.2d 1019, 1022 (Ind. 1986).
119. Cabakov v. Thatcher, 37 N.J. Super. 540, 544 (1980).
120. KEETON ETAL., supra note 40, § 62, at 433.
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3. Stigmatizing the Wayward Corporation-Corporations
often fear the adverse publicity that accompanies punitive
damages and other forms of civil punishment far more than the
monetary costs. 121 Being publicly labeled as an endangerer of the
public welfare is the functional equivalent of a shaming cere-
mony for individuals. This blow to the firm's public image may
act as a "scarlet letter" for corporations. 122 As Justice O'Connor
notes, "there is a stigma attached to an award of punitive dam-
ages that does not accompany a purely compensatory award.
The punitive character of punitive damages means that there is
more than just money at stake."" Scholars of the New Chicago
School point out that compliance is a complex relationship be-
tween legal, social and behavioral norms.'2
The plutonium contamination case in Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee
Corp." became the subject of an Academy Award winning
movie. Goodyear suffered damaging publicity when CBS' "60
Minutes" broadcast an expos6 of the dangers of exploding rim-
less tires entitled, "Killer Wheels."26 The trend towards secret
settlements is motivated in part by a desire to avoid this type of
public exposure.
27
Adverse publicity can severely damage a company by shat-
tering public confidence.'2 8 Ford's Pinto was America's best
selling car in the early 1970s, but had to be withdrawn from the
121. See Rustad, supra note 24, at 77-78 ("Defense attorneys and corporate offi-
cials viewed adverse publicity as the ultimate sanction posed by punitive damages....
It is not the payment of punitive damages that is so greatly feared; it is the publicity
and the stigma.').
122. See Andrew Cowan, Scarlet Letters for Corporations? Punishment by Public-
ity Under the New Sentencing Guidelines, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 2387, 2388 (1992) (noting
that "the bulk of corporate crime reporting generally appears in the back pages of
newspapers or in the financial section" and is therefore not noticed by the general
public); see also Andrea A. Curcio, Painful Publicity-An Alternative Punitive Damage
Sanction, 45 DEPAUL L. REV. 341, 343 (1996) (proposing the adoption of a mandatory
publicity component to punitive damage awards, since businesses dread negative
publicity).
123. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 54 (1991) (O'Connor, J., dis-
senting).
124. See generally ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: How NEIGHBORS
SETTLE DIsPUTEs (1991) (arguing importance of individual social norms in compli-
ance); Dan M. Kahan & Martha C. Nussbaum, Two Conceptions of Emotion in
Criminal Law, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 269, 348-49 (1996) (arguing that non-legal sanc-
tions play a key role in social control).
125. 769 F.2d 1451 (10th Cir. 1985).
126. See Lola Butcher, Courting a Chosen 12, 8 KAN. CITY BUS. J. 21 (1990).
127. See Rustad, supra note 24, at 61-62 (reporting trend toward confidential
post-verdict settlements of punitive damages).
128. See MARSHALL B. CLINARD & PETER C. YEAGER, CORPORATE CRIME 318 (1980)
(finding that firms feared bad publicity more than formal sanctions).
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market when consumers began to associate the vehicle with
flaming death. Few consumers would purchase the automobile
even after the integrity of the fuel system was corrected.
D. Corporate Crimtort Culpability
1. Corporate Punitive Liability-Chief Justice John Marshall
noted that a corporation is "an artificial being, invisible, intan-
gible and existing only in contemplation of law,"29 but the proper
method of imputing an agent's wrongdoing to the corporation is
a subject of continuing controversy.130 Agency theory makes a
corporation potentially liable for an "employee's outrageous con-
duct since a jury could award punitive damages for that
employee's actions."13' And while oversight of decentralized
agents becomes increasingly difficult, it has become increasingly
necessary as American society grows more complex."2 Vicarious
liability and the complicity rule are the two competing theories
for imputing punitive liability to organizations. Vicarious tort
liability, or imputed negligence, is a form of strict liability in
that a firm may be assessed punitive damages even though it
129. Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 US. (4 Wheat.) 518, 636 (1819).
130. See Robert J. Stern & D. Jackson Loughhead, Vicarious Liability for Punitive
Damages: The Worst Side of a Questionable Doctrine, 54 DEF. COUNS. J. 29, 32-33
(1987) (arguing that vicarious punitive damages are unfair); cf Thomas C. Galligan,
Jr., Augmented Awards: The Efficient Evolution of Punitive Damages, 51 LA. L. REV. 3,
84 (1990) (arguing for imposing vicarious punitive damages to advance the goal of
efficiency). Corporations may be able to insure for vicarious liability. See, e.g., Dayton
Hudson Corp. v. American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 621 P.2d 1155, 1160 (Okla. 1980)
(stating that recovery of indemnity from an insurer by an employer who is liable for
the willful or grossly negligent conduct of his employee is not against public policy).
131. Clement L. Hyland, Labor and Employment Law: 1994 Survey of Florida
Law--A Confluence of Streams, 19 NOVA L. REV. 161, 182 (1994).
132. Technological and organization change increases the importance of vicarious
punitive liability. For example, strong corporate incentives are necessary to prevent
illegal insider trading in the financial services industry:
Organizational adaptions to the changing informational needs enabled abuse,
as investment banks, in particular, developed flexible organizational structures
to respond quickly to changing product needs. In these self-designing organiza-
tions coordination and control were constant problems not easily solved
through hierarchies of rules and procedures. Normative controls where they
existed were often extra-organizational.
Nancy Reichman, Insider Trading, in BEYOND THE LAW: CRIME IN COMPLEX OR-
GANIZATIONS, supra note 107, at 55, 90 (arguing for the need to develop structurally
based dynamic models of corporate crime).
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had no knowledge of its agent's misbehavior.13  Vicarious liabil-
ity creates incentives for firms "to screen or train employees
more carefully." "3 The complicity rule, on the other hand, re-
quires corporate authorization or ratification before imposing
indirect punitive liability.'35 The Supreme Court in Pacific Mu-
tual Life Insurance Co. v. Haslip36 found no due process problem
in assessing punitive damages against a corporation based upon
the actions of a rogue agent who absconded with the plaintiff's
insurance premiums. Imputing an agent's wrongdoing to a cor-
poration is justified if "the cost of the resulting increase in
employer vigilance is less than the harm that it averts." 7
2. Corporate Family Liability-The culpability of corporate
families poses particular problems in the field of crimtorts. It is
well-established that a successor corporation may be liable for
the punitive damages of its predecessor. 3 However, a parent
corporation may isolate those risky activities in separate sub-
133. William Prosser notes that imputed negligence is also called "vicarious li-
ability, or the principle is given the Latin name of respondeat superior." KEETON ET.
AL., supra note 40, § 69, at 499. The exception to vicarious liability is if the employee's
wrongdoing is committed on a "frolic or detour" from his normal duties. See Young B.
Smith, Frolic and Detour, 23 COLUM. L. REv. 444 (1923); Comment, The Assessment of
Punitive Damages Against an Entrepreneur for the Malicious Torts of His Employees,
70 YALE L.J. 1296, 1300 n.34 (1961).
Section six of NCCUSL's Model Punitive Damages Act provides that one defendant
is vicariously liable for the wrongdoing of another, provided the misconduct occurred
"in the course and within the scope of the employment or agency and the employer or
principal, with knowledge of its wrongful nature, directed, authorized, participated in,
consented to, acquiesced in or ratified the conduct of an employee or agent." MODEL
PUNITIVE DAMAGES ACT, § 6 rep. note (1996) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
AGENCY § 217C (1958); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 909B (1979)).
134. DAN B. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES: DAMAGES-EQUITY-
RESTITUTION § 3.9, at 214-15 (1973).
135. The term "complicity rule" was coined in an article by Clarence Morris, Puni-
tive Damages in Personal Injury Cases, 21 OHIO ST. L.J. 216, 221 (1960). Professor
Morris' complicity rule requires that the plaintiff prove some deliberate corporate
participation before corporate punitive liability may be imposed. Generally, a high-
level officer of the corporation must have ordered, participated in, or ratified the egre-
gious conduct of the employee for the firm to be assessed punitive damages. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY, § 217C (1958); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 909 (1979).
136. 499 U.S. 1 (1991).
137. Robert D. Cooter, Economic Analysis of Punitive Damages, 56 S. CAL. L. REV.
79, 96 (1982).
138. See Celotex Corp. v. Pickett, 490 So.2d 35 (Fla. 1986) (holding a successor
corporation may be liable for punitive damages for the reckless conduct of a predeces-
sor). In Pickett, an insulator was exposed to asbestos for three years. Celotex, the
corporate successor to Philip Carey, was held to also succeed to punitive damages
liability. See id. at 38; see also Wussow v. Commercial Mechanisms, Inc., 293 N.W.2d
897, 907 (Wis. 1980) (holding that successor to defunct corporation is liable for prede-
cessor's conduct).
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sidiary corporations in the absence of joint and several liabil-
ity 39  Courts are reluctant to pierce the corporate veil,
respecting the legal fiction that each member of a corporate
family has a separate legal persona.4 Corporate punishment
frequently involves the liability of several defendants who act in
concert.4 The common law permits evidence of culpability and
wealth to be admissible against all defendants where joint tort-
feasors are implicated in wrongdoing.4 2  A minority of
jurisdictions permit, and even require, joint and several punitive
damages.
4 3
The critics of joint and several liability argue that this doc-
trine encourages plaintiffs to seek out the deep pocket through a
"shotgun" style of pleading,'" but the possible injustice of joint
and several punitive liability is mitigated by apportioning the
139. See Richard A. Westin & Sanford E. Gaines, The Relationship of Federal In-
come Taxes to Toxic Wastes: A Selective Study, 16 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REv. 753, 786,
790 (1989) (contending that parent firm and subsidiaries considered to be members of
the same economic family will isolate environmentally risky activities in a weakly
capitalized subsidiary to avoid punitive liability). For example, if a foreign company
uses a closely held but undercapitalized American subsidiary to export goods, it may
be difficult to unravel, much less apportion, the wrongdoing. The wrongdoing leading
to punitive damages in product liability is frequently indivisible and, therefore, inca-
pable of apportionment.
140. "Piercing the corporate veil" is generally permitted only when the two corpo-
rations can be shown to be so closely intertwined that they should be considered one
and the same. See Joel R. Burcat & Craig P. Wilson, Post-dissolution Liability of Ccr-
porations and Their Shareholders Under CERCLA, 50 BuS. LAW. 1273 (1995) (citing
Joslyn Manufacturing Co. v. T.L. James & Co., 893 F.2d 80 (5th Cir. 1990)).
141. One of the frequent issues is whether the parent corporation's wealth is ad-
missible when the subsidiary is charged with wrongdoing. Joint and several liability
problems will frequently arise when a parent and subsidiary firm are in a product
distribution chain. See generally 1 JAMES GHIARDI & JOHN KIRCHER, PUNITIVE
DAMAGES LAW AND PRACTICE § 9.09, at 27 (1988); DOBBS, supra note 134, § 3.9, at 215.
142. Punitive damages have been assessed jointly and severally since the English
case of Merryweather v. Nixon, 101 Eng. Rep. 1337 (KB. 1799).
143. The Wisconsin Court of Appeals affirmed a joint and several liability punitive
damages award against several joint tortfeasors in the distribution chain involved in
the sale of a used boat in Radford v. JJB. Enterprises, Ltd., 472 N.W.2d 790 (Wis. Ct.
App. 1991). The Tennessee Supreme Court permitted joint and several punitive dam-
ages in Odom v. Gray, 508 S.W.2d 526 (Tenn. 1974); and in Huckleby v. Spangler, 563
S.W.2d 555, 558 (Tenn. 1978), the court found it unobjectionable to base a joint and
several punitive damages award upon the net worth or assets of only one of several
punitive damage defendants. The Alabama Supreme Court held that punitive dam-
ages in wrongful death actions may not be apportioned among joint tortfeasors in
Tatum v. Schering Corp., 523 So. 2d 1042 (Ala. 1988) and affirmed the assessment of
joint and several unapportioned punitive damage awards against three defendants in
an estate action for conversion in Lyons v. Williams, 567 So. 2d 1280 (Ala. 1990).
144. See Thomas A. Eaton & Susette M. Talarico, A Profile of Tort Litigation in
Georgia and Reflections on Tort Reform, 30 GA. L. REv. 627, 683 (1996).
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award based upon each defendant's culpability l4 Where the
wrong cannot be apportioned, joint and several liability allo-
cates the burden of an uncollected damages award upon the
solvent codefendant, rather than the injured plaintiff.14 6
III. POLICY ALTERNATIVES TO CRIMTORTS
A variety of policy options are available to punish and deter
corporate endangerment of the public interest.14 1 States are
145. See generally D.E. Ytreberg, Annotation, Apportionment of Punitive or Exem-
plary Damages as Between Joint Tortfeasors, 20 A.L.R.3d 666 (1968) (discussing
whether punitive damages may be apportioned among joint tortfeasors).
146. A number of jurisdictions permit joint and several punitive damages. See
Blue v. Rose, 786 F.2d 349, 352-53 (8th Cir. 1986) (holding partners jointly and sever-
ally liable for punitive damages based on actions of one or more partners); Pease v.
Alford Photo Indus., Inc., 667 F. Supp. 1188, 1203 (W.D. Tenn. 1987) (awarding puni-
tive damages jointly and severally); Elwell v. Stone, 799 S.W.2d 46, 47 (Ky. Ct. App.
1990) (affirming judgment awarding punitive damages jointly and severally on the
basis of appelants' failure to preserve error); Mervis v. Wolverton, 211 So. 2d 847, 847
(Miss. 1968) (reversing punitive damages portion of joint and several judgment
against estate of deceased defendant); Caple v. Raynel Campers, Inc., 526 P.2d 334,
335-36 (Nev. 1974) (affirming joint and several punitive damages award). Jurisdic-
tions vary in allowing the jury to take wealth into account in making different
punitive awards against joint tortfeasors. Linda Schlueter and Kenneth Redden note
that a "majority have refused to admit evidence of the financial resources of any of the
defendants so as to avoid prejudice to the less financially sound defendants." 1 LINDA
L. SCHLUETER & KENNETH R. REDDEN, PUNITIVE DAMAGES § 4.4(B)(2)(b)(3) (2d ed.
1990).
147. As Reiss and Tonrey note:
A central problem of modern societies is to control the behavior of organizations
in the public interest. There are several principal ways of doing so.
One is to rely on governments to make laws and rules governing the behavior of
organizations and to establish techniques for their enforcement or compliance
with them. Our civil, criminal, and administrative law systems are the founda-
tion of legal control of organizational behavior. Public prosecution, civil
litigation, and regulatory actions are their hallmarks.
Another is to trust that market mechanisms can control organizational behav-
ior...
Market mechanisms of control are more or less indifferent to the legality of
commodities or services, however, and competition may be restricted by illegal
means such as coercive violence, as well as by legal means....
A third way to control the behavior of organizations in the public interest is to
depend on aggrieved parties-typically private organizations or individuals-to
exercise control over organizations through civil suits for compensatory or pu-
nitive damages.
"Crimtorts" as Corporate Just Deserts
laboratories of public policy that vary in their approach to con-
trolling corporate abuses of power. Some states favor strong
regulatory bodies, while others place more emphasis on private
attorneys general."8 A few states have devised new corporate
criminal sanctions.9 If wealth-based punitive damages are to
be stricken from the legal landscape, alternative methods of
controlling corporate misbehavior must be developed.
A. Criminalization of Crimtorts
Criminal penalties against corporations offer possible alter-
natives to crimtorts.' 50 Court-ordered corporate reorganization
has occasionally been used to punish wayward corporations. 5'
Albert J. Reiss, Jr. & Michael Tonry, Organizational Crime, in BEYOND THE LAW:
CRIME IN COMPLEX ORGANIZATIONS, supra note 107, at 1, 8-9.
148. States rely upon different methods for the public regulation of corporate
crime. For example, Massachusetts does not recognize the doctrine of punitive dam-
ages in common law, but the Massachusetts Attorney General has active oversight in
the fields of consumer protection, civil rights and financial services. Alabama, in con-
trast, has extremely weak public oversight, providing little control over abuses by
insurers. Punitive damages plays a key role in protecting Alabama consumers from
the worst excesses of insurance companies. See Phillip Rawls, Abundance of Lawsuits
Earn Alabama Title: "Jackpot Justice," CHI. TRIB., Feb. 28, 1996, at 2 (quoting former
Lt. Gov. Jake Beasley).
149. California uses fines and imprisonment to punish an employer's willful viola-
tion of any occupational safety or health standard or order which causes death or
serious illness to an employee. See CAL. LAB. CODE § 6425 (West 1996). The remedy is
very rarely used. Recently the California Assembly passed a bill limiting corporate
criminal liability. "Under current law, prosecutors must prove only that the manager
or corporation 'should have known' about a hidden or 'seriously concealed danger ' "
before imposing criminal liability. The new bill requires the corporation to have actual
knowledge of a "serious concealed danger." Littler, et al., California Assembly Passes
Bill Limiting Corporate Criminal Liability, 5 CALIF. EMPL. L. MONITOR 6 (Feb. 26,
1996). While California is considering retrenchment, Washington State is debating a
bill that would make it a crime for a director of a corporation to approve an act that
endangers public health or safety. See H.B. 1744, 55th Leg., 1997 Reg. Sess. (Wash.
1997).
150. In Japan, firms can be punished with the functional equivalent of imprison-
ment: "In 1982 the Japanese Health Ministry, responding to drug marketing
violations, shut down Nippon Chemiphar for 80 days, sealing its plants and ware-
houses. The company, which prior to this action boasted $100 million in annual sales,
suffered a precipitous decline on the stock market." Christopher Kennedy, Comment,
Criminal Sentences for Corporations: Alternative Fining Mechanisms, 73 CAL. L. REV.
443, 446 n.10 (1985).
151. See Brent Fisse, Reconstructing Corporate Criminal Law: Deterrence, Retri-
bution, Fault and Sanctions, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 1141 (1983) (citing examples of courts
ordering corporate death through quo warranto proceedings); Kennedy, supra note
150, at 445-46 n.10 (noting that quo warranto is too rigid to be a practical means of
corporate punishment).
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However, if the criminal penalty is too high or the standard too
vague, there will be a chilling effect on legitimate business ac-
tivities. A corporate death penalty is another possible social
sanction, but the loss of a corporate franchise is too severe a
punishment for most crimtorts.
152
Jailing corporate executives both deters and punishes, but
this penalty carries significant social costs.153 As Richard Posner
notes, it may be more efficient to award substantial punitive
damages "on top of compensatory damages, rather than...
locking the defendant up."' Moreover, due to the immense le-
gal, political, and social resources possessed by corporations,
152. Despite the social dangers posed by corporate abuse of power, the large firm
is an invaluable wealth producing institution. See PETER DRUCKER, CONCEPT OF THE
CORPORATION 5 (1972) (arguing that "[tihe central problem of all modem society is not
whether we want Big Business but what we want of it, and what organization of Big
Business and of the society it serves is best equipped to realize our wishes and de-
mands").
153. David 0. Friedrichs presents an excellent summary of the case for and
against imprisoning white collar offenders:
Some arguments in favor of incarceration include the following-. (1) Because
white collar offenses typically involve a high level of intent, calculation, and ra-
tionality and are typically committed over an extended period of time, the
purely punitive dimension of prison is especially deserved; (2) the prospect of
prison, perhaps more than any other sanction, is feared by white collar offend-
ers, and thus it has a powerful deterrent effect on both convicted and
prospective offenders alike; (3) the scope of harm caused by white collar offend-
ers is often great enough to merit so serious a punishment as incarceration; (4)
it is simply unfair (and an inspiration for cynicism) to send conventional of-
fenders to prison in large numbers without imposing the same sanction on
white collar offenders who have caused equivalent or greater harm, typically
with less excuse for doing so; and (5) the victims of white collar crimes, espe-
cially those who have suffered direct losses and injuries, may expect or demand
imprisonment for convicted offenders.
Conversely, the various arguments advanced against the use of imprisonment
in white collar cases include the following-. (1) the "rehabilitation" dimension of
imprisonment, which is one rationale for its existence, simply does not apply to
white collar offenders, who are not in need of rehabilitative training, (2) the
humiliation and loss of status and position suffered by white collar offenders
are on the average substantially greater than those sustained by conventional
offenders, and imprisonment is a gratuitous, additional punishment; (3) it is
wasteful to put people in prison, especially highly competent business execu-
tives, professionals, and other skilled and well-educated people who could be
making constructive contributions in the larger society; (4) white collar offend-
ers are not "dangerous" in the direct, predatory sense, and accordingly they
need not be incarcerated; and, (5) it is more beneficial to victims of white collar
crimes to require offenders to earn money legally outside prison and make res-
titution, which also saves taxpayers the costs of incarceration.
FRIEDRICHS, supra note 109, at 351-52.
154. POSNER, supra note 13, at 54.
WINTER 19981 "Crimtorts" as Corporate Just Deserts
imprisonment of American executives for even the most egre-
gious corporate misbehavior is extremely rare. 5' If public
prosecutors or regulators replace private attorneys general in
these suits, there will be even greater fiscal costs. More ominous




Corporate probation is constrained by the inherent incapacity
of courts to monitor complex organizations157 but John Coffee
proposes a form of corporate probation which includes a mecha-
nism for sanctioning the company through adverse publicity.
Probation would consist of a firm being required to publish the
details of both its wrongdoing and its implementation of court
155. James W. Coleman notes:
That the white-collar defendant's ability to pay for a first-rate defense-the best
lawyers, numerous appeals, and if necessary, private investigators and expert
witnesses-is probably of even greater importance [in protecting them from se-
vere punishment]. Many former defendants have openly admitted that their
ability to "hire the best" was the decisive factor in their case....
JAMES W. COLEMAN, THE CRIMINAL ELITE: THE SOCIOLOGY OF WHITE-COLLAR CRIME
178 (3d ed. 1994).
156. David Simon summarizes some alternative means of curbing organizational
or corporate deviance that have been advocated by social scientists:
Declare occupational disqualification for corporate offenders; Use fines, impris-
onment, and rehabilitation more extensively in punishing convicted corporate
executives; Appoint certain members of boards of directors of convicted compa-
nies to represent the public interest by a Federal Corporation Commission.
Their task would be to assure that laws are being complied with, to oversee the
environmental impact of future actions by convicted corporations, to oversee
mandated reforms, and to implement judgments against the corporation; Deny
insurance coverage to companies lacking adequate systems of information con-
cerning internal wrongdoing; Designate a specific corporate official to be
charged with the preparation of all raw data concerning violations and disclo-
sure thereof; Provide inspectors to oversee enforcement of federal regulations;
Offer protection and rewards to so-called whistle blowers; and establishing an
exchange program between officials in both business and government.
DAVID R. SIMON, ELITE DEVIANCE 334 (5th ed. 1996).
157. See Kennedy, supra note 150, at 445 n.10.
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ordered reforms."'a Such formal publicity sends a message of
zero tolerance to corporate wrongdoers.'59
C. Capping Punitive Damages
A number of states have stricken wealth from the punitive
damages equation by capping this remedy, generally at the
greater of a fixed sum or some multiple of the compensatory
damages'60 However, such caps "artificially and arbitrarily de-
flate punitive damages, no matter how egregious the
defendant's disregard of health and safety"161 The arbitrary
limitation of punitive damages to the harm suffered by the
158. See John C. Coffee, Jr., No Soul to Damn No Body to Kick: An Unscandalized
Inquiry into the Problem of Corporate Punishment, 79 MICH. L. REV. 386, 431-34
(1981); see also Brent Fisse, The Use of Publicity as a Criminal Sanction Against
Business Corporations, 8 MELB. U L. REV. 107 (1971) (evaluating the usefulness of
limited formal publicity sanctions).
159. See Book Review: The Impact of Publicity on Corporate Offenders, DUKE L.J.
158, 158 (1984) (reviewing BRENT FISSE AND JOHN BRAITHWAITE, THE IMPACT OF
PUBLICITY ON CORPORATE OFFENDERS (1983)) (noting that Fisse and Braithwaite view
informal publicity as "creating an atmosphere in which corporate crime is not toler-
ated, and formal publicity is employed as a sanction, either as a punishment in a
criminal proceeding or as a civil remedy").
160. States adopting the fixed ratio approach limit punitive damages to a specified
amount of compensatory damages. A fixed-ratio ceiling sets punitive damages at a
predetermined maximum ratio to the amount of compensatory damages. Five states
employ fixed-ratio caps: Colorado, see COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-102(3) (1987) (limiting
recovery to three times the amount of actual damages); Florida, see FLA. STAT. ANN.
ch. 768.72 (Harrison 1994); Nevada, see tit. 23 NEV. REV. STAT. § 42.005 (1995); Okla-
homa, see OKLA. STAT. ANN., § 9.1 (West Supp. 1998); and Texas, see TE. CIv. PRAC. &
REM. CODE ANN. § 41.008(b) (West 1997). Virginia caps punitive damages at $350,000.
See VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-38.1 (Michie 1992). No state employing a fixed amount cap
employs inflation adjustments. As the value of money decreases, so does the level of
punishment. A few jurisdictions employ a combination of fixed amounts and ratios to
set punitive damages. A few states have adopted hybrid approaches. Kansas, for ex-
ample, limits punitive damages to the lesser of five million dollars or the "defendant's
highest gross annual income earned for any one of the five years immediately before
the act for which such damages are awarded." KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3701(e) (1991).
The plaintiff can circumvent the Kansas cap by proving that a defendant expected to
make profit exceeding the maximum damage award. See id. § 60-3701(f) (providing for
exception if expected profits exceed limitation). If the plaintiff qualifies for the excep-
tion, damages may be set at one and one-half times the defendant's expected profit as
a result of the misconduct. See id. North Dakota limits punitive damages to no more
than twice compensatory damages or $250,000, whichever is greater. See N.D. CENT.
CODE § 3203.2-1(4) (1995).
161. Hearings on the Prod. Liab. Reform Act of 1997 Before the Senate Comm. on
Commerce, Science, and Trans., 105th Cong. (1997) (statement-of Lucinda M. Finley,
Professor of Law, SUNY Buffalo Law School).
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plaintiff undermines deterrence because the sanction is then
limited to a predictable amount of money."'
Capped punitive damages are particularly ineffective when
the level of compensatory damages is low. A nursing home's de-
cision to short-staff its facility is unlikely to be prosecuted by
private attorneys general because the elderly residents have
such low imputed economic value.163 The Supreme Court has
validated the use of potential harm to justify high ratio punitive
damages where the actual damages are small. In TXO Produc-
tion Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp.,"' the Supreme Court
upheld a punitive damages award of $10 million, which was 526
times greater than the actual damages. The Court found the
award justifiable because of the potential economic harm, con-
sidering both TXO's wealth and that the "scheme... was part of
a larger pattern of fraud, trickery and deceit."1"
IV. EMPIRICAL STUDIES OF WEALTH IN CIVIL PUNISHMENT
The radical expansion of crimtort penalties in the form of pu-
nitive damages, civil fines, and statutorily permitted multiple
damages reflects a new wealth-based model for civil punish-
ment.
The federal government has enacted a wide range of wealth-
based civil and criminal fines. 66  Thousands of statutes
162. Some commentators argue that capping punitive damages will lessen the de-
torrent value of the remedy by permitting firms to conduct cost-benefit analyses in
order to determine the potential profitability of trading public safety for profits. See,
e.g., Sylvia M. Demarest & David E. Jones, Exemplary Damages as an Instrument of
Social Policy: Is 7brt Reform in the Public Interest?, 18 ST. MARY'S L.J. 797, 825 &
n.156 (1987) (criticizing punitive damages caps as arbitrarily imposed, thereby creat-
ing disproportionate results); Jimmie 0. Clements, Jr., Comment, Limiting Punitive
Damages: A Placebo for America's Ailing Competitiveness, 24 ST. MARYS L.J. 197, 218-
19 (1992) (asserting that punitive damages cap would cause malicious conduct to go
undeterred and unpunished); Amelia J. Toy, Comment, Statutory Punitive Damage
Caps and the Profit Motive: An Economic Perspective, 40 EMORY L.J. 303, 335 (1991)
(stating that statutory punitive damages caps, by allowing potential tortfeasors to
calculate maximum expected costs, sacrifice goals of punitive damages).
163. The typical elderly resident has no economic value under traditional compen-
satory damages formulas. Compensatory damages typically are calibrated to the
expected future earnings of the claimant. See Rustad & Koenig, supra note 33, at
1053-65 (providing examples of punitive damages for nursing home neglect).
164. 509 US. 443 (1993).
165. Id. at 462.
166. Franklin E. Zimring has detailed this trend: The federal criminal code of
1984 greatly expanded the range of criminal fines, and both federal and state criminal
sanctions now include options like restitution, the payment of some enforcement
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providing graduated civil punishment or multiple damages have
been enacted at the state and federal level.'67 The recommended
federal organizational sentencing guidelines implicitly recognize
that large civil fines are necessary to deter corporate
misconduct. 6 ' These guidelines include consideration of
various factors, including the amount of loss the offense
caused (sometimes diffuse and difficult to calculate); the
offense "multiple" (difficulty of detecting and prosecuting,
to ensure that the fine is both a deterrent and a just pun-
ishment); and the enforcement costs involved. These
factors are added together to produce a total monetary
sanction (which may be broken down into restitution, for-
feitures and fines). 69
These guidelines provide for organizational fines as high as
$290 million. 7°
Federal statutes increasingly permit claimants to collect pu-
nitive damages in order to encourage private attorneys general
to augment public prosecution. The Agricultural Adjustment Act
of 1938,'' Bank Holding Company Act,' Consumer Credit Pro-
tection Act, 73 Fair Housing Act, 74 Federal National Mortgage
costs, and reparative remedies such as community service." Franklin E. Zimring, The
Multiple Middlegrounds Between Civil and Criminal Law, 101 YALE L.J. 1901, 1904
(1992). See generally Mann, supra note 78, at 1848-49 (describing how courts have
encouraged civil fines in cases where plaintiffs could also have pursued criminal sanc-
tions).
167. John C. Coffee notes that "[criminal defense practitioner Stanley Arkin's] es-
timate places the number of federal regulations currently punishable by criminal
penalties at over 300,000." Coffee, supra note 78, at 1881 (footnotes omitted). There
are an equal number of state statutes blending civil and criminal penalties.
168. The drafters of the federal sentencing guidelines for corporations had diffi-
culty finding any examples of successful criminal prosecutions. See Ilene H. Nagel &
Winthrop M. Swenson, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines for Corporations: Their
Development, Theoretical Underpinnings, and Some Thoughts About Their Future, 71
WASH. U. L.Q. 205, 214-15 (1993). Critics argue that the Guidelines' vagueness places
"on corporations another burden: ascertaining what the Guidelines mean and how to
comply with them." Note, Growing the Carrot: Encouraging Effective Corporate Com-
pliance, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1783 (1996). See generally Richard S. Gruner, Just
Punishment and Adequate Deterrence for Organizational Misconduct: Scaling Eco-
nomic Penalties Under the New Corporate Sentencing Guidelines, 66 S. CAL. L. REV.
225 (1992) (advocating cost based fines as a corporate criminal sanction).
169. FRIEDRICHS, supra note 109, at 348 (citation omitted).
170. See Christopher A. Wray, Note, Corporate Probation Under the New Organ-
izational Sentencing Guidelines, 101 YALE L.J. 2017, 2027 (1992).
171. 7 U.S.C. §§ 1314(a), 1339(a)(1), 1346(a), 1359(a) (1994).
172. 12 U.S.C. § 1975 (1994).
173. 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(2) (1994).
174. 42 U.S.C. § 3613(c)(1) (1994).
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Association Charter Act,"5 Federal Property and Administrative
Services Act of 1949,"' Organized Crime Control Act of 1970
(RICO),' Patent Act 7 s Prevention of Unfair Methods of Com-
petition in Import Trade,179 Regional Rail Reorganization Act of
1973,18 Trademark Act of 1946,181 Petroleum Marketing Prac-
tices Act, 8 2 and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission
Act of 19 7318 are all statutory examples of civil punishment."M
These provisions for civil punishment are the functional
equivalent of crimtorts.
Some legal scholars argue that normative principles require
that the prosperous and the poor be assessed the same level of
punitive damages and that due process is violated- by larger
awards against corporations.'85 Criminal and tort law both treat
defendants with a formal equality.186 As the Laidlaw v. Sage's
court stated, a "cardinal principle" of American law is that the
"rich and the poor stand alike in courts of justice, and that nei-
ther the wealth of the one nor the poverty of the other shall be
permitted to affect the administration of the law."18 In fact, the
175. 12 U.S.C. § 1723a(e) (1994).
176. 40 U.S.C. § 489(b)(1) (1994).
177. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1994).
178. 35 US.C. § 284 (1994).
179. 15 U.S.C. § 72 (1994).
180. 45 U.S.C. § 711(j) (1994).
181. 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a) (1994).
182. 15 US.C. § 2805(d)(1)(8) (1994).
183. 7 U.S.C. § 9 (1994).
184. See 1 LINDA SCHLUETTER & KENNETH REDDEN, PUNITIVE DAMAGES (3rd ed.
1995). (citing examples of multiple damages).
185. See Paul J. Zwier, Due Process and Punitive Damages, 1991 UTAH L. REV. 407
(citing examples of multiple damages).
186. Anatole France satirized formal legal equality by stating that the poor "must
labour in the face of the majestic equality of the laws, which forbid rich and poor alike
to sleep under the bridges, to beg in the streets, and to steal their bread." ANATOLE
FRANCE, THE RED LILY 75 (1917 ed.) (1894).
In reality, wealth and power shape life chances in a variety of ways. A graphic illus-
tration is the 1912 sinking of the Titanic, where class strongly affected who lived and
who perished. "Among the women,... 3 percent of the first-class passengers drowned,
compared to 16 percent of the second-class and 45 percent of the third-class passen-
gers." DENNIS GILBERT & JOSEPH A. KAHL, THE AMERICAN CLASS STRUCTURE: A NEW
SYNTHESIS 2 (4th ed. 1993).
187. 52 N.E. 679 (N.Y. 1899).
188. Id. at 690.
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rich are rarely criminally prosecuted, while the poor, having
"shallow pockets,"1 89 are very rarely sued for crimtorts.1 9
Distinctions based upon wealth are not considered to be re-
markable in American law. The United States, for example, has
a progressive income tax which assesses the prosperous at a dif-
ferent rate than the poor. Wealthy families are excluded from
need-based governmentally funded student aid programs. The
recipients of Social Security benefits are taxed if their income
exceeds a certain threshold. The Sherman Act exacts fines up to
$10 million for corporations, but caps fines for individuals at
$350,000.'9' Taxes are frequently skewed so that owners of
commercial property or expensive homes pay a larger percent-
age of the property's value.
The use of wealth in crimtorts may appear anomalous but the
remedy of punitive damages "is not an innovation of common
law, it is the common law."9 2 Nearly every American jurisdiction
that recognizes punitive damages permits evidence of financial
standing to be considered in order to ensure that the award is
large enough to deter the wrongdoer.193 The flexibility of punitive
damages makes it an effective sanction against wealthy actors,
given the requisite level of risk averseness."
189. "Shallow pockets," the lack of wealth of the defendant, may be admitted as a
mitigating factor in a punitive damages trial. See Dag E. Ytreberg, Annotation, Ad-
missibility on Defendant's Behalf as Matter in Mitigation of Punitive Damages, of
Evidence as to His Lack of Financial Resources, 79 A-L.R.3d 1138 (1997). In Rupert v.
Sellers, 368 N.YS.2d 904 (1975), the court held that the defendant had a right to show
his lack of wealth to diminish the size of punitive damages. See also Kemezy v. Peters,
79 F.3d 33 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding that a policeman's lack of financial assets should be
considered in assessing punitive damages against him).
190. See Richard Posner, An Economic Theory of the Criminal Law, 85 COLUM. L.
REV. 1193, 1204-05 (1985) (arguing that "the criminal law is designed primarily for
the non-affluent; the affluent are kept in line, for the most part, by tort law").
191. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1996).
192. Edwards v. Leavitt, 46 Vt. 126, 135 (1873); see also Brown v. Evans, 17 F. 912,
914 (C.C.D. Nev. 1883) (explaining that "if exemplary damages may be given by way of
punishment for an outrageous act, the jury must know something, at least, of the
defendant's ability to respond in damages, since what would be a severe verdict to one
with limited means might be but a trifle to one of large means, and the rule utterly
fail").
193. Evidence of the defendant's wealth is currently admissible in 36 of the 45
states permitting punitive damages to be assessed under common law. See 1 GHIARDI
& KIRCHER, supra note 141, § 5.36. The Restatement (Second) of Torts recognizes the
validity of wealth in assessing punitive damages. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 908(2) cmt. e (1977); see also TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 509 US.
443, 462 n.28 (1993) (stating that the admissibility of wealth in determining the size
of punitive damages is "well-settled law"); Kemezy v. Peters, 79 F.3d 33 (7th Cir. 1996)
(explaining that the majority of jurisdictions permit, but do not require, wealth to be
considered in assessing damages).
194. Paul Zweier argues that:
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The dispute over wealth in crimtort remedies is too often
dominated by theoretical concerns about overdeterrence, anec-
dotes, and tort horror stories rather than empirical research.95
Abstract models of corporate deterrence are necessarily prem-
ised on the idea that all corporations respond similarly to
punitive sanctions.' 96 By examining the largest punitive damage
The wealth of the defendant is central because money damages are the only
workable means of deterrence. Because of their financial status, the wealthy in
effect are able to buy the right to intentionally injure others. Thus, wealth can
have the impact of encouraging otherwise impermissible behavior. For equal de-
terrence, therefore, different punitive damage amounts should be awarded on
the basis of the wealth of the actor. This approach is entirely rational under a
due process analysis.
Jennifer H, Arlen, Should Defendant's Wealth Matter?, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 413, 414
(1992) (quoting Paul Zweier).
Edward Dauer holds a similar position:
If we're attempting to change corporate behavior, then it makes sense to think
about a wealth-related measure of punitive damages. A risk-neutral person is
one who is indifferent to damages of one dollar or a one percent chance of one
hundred dollars. A risk-averse person is one who, due to wealth constraints or
other factors, and not just due to psychological disposition, doesn't want to take
the chance of losing the one hundred dollars. It may be the larger the corpora-
tion, the closer it is to being risk-neutral .... [Thus] it takes a greater amount
to move a larger entity from risk-neutrality to risk-aversiveness.
Edward Dauer, Punitive Damages: Comment: Symposium Discussion, 56 S. CAL. L.
REv. 155, 187-88 (1982).
195. A full-page advertisement in the Washington Post and Washington Times
urged Congress to cap noneconomic damages at $250,000. "The ad pictures a doctor
holding a baby and says, 'Maureen O'Regan put her name down in support of liability
reform... Dr. Maureen O'Regan wants to be able to deliver babies ... but the [legal]
risk is too great." Liability Reform: Groups Run Ads to Support Their Views, HEALTH
LINE, Apr. 26, 1995. Former Vice President Dan Quayle regaled audiences with a
story:
[A] psychic who was awarded nearly $1 million because a CAT scan allegedly
robbed her of her psychic powers' but he didn't mention that the judge dis-
missed the awards. Ronald Reagan recounted how a cat burglar sued a
homeowner for injuries incurred while falling through a skylight. When the
real case was identified, the plaintiff turned out to be high school student sent
to retrieve athletic equipment stored on the roof of a school and had fallen
through a skylight.
Carl Bogus, Tort "Reform"Should be Kept Out of Contract, PALM BEACH POST, July 16,
1995, at IF.
196. As John Coffee notes, models are designed to deal with typical organizations,
not the occasional amoral firm:
[f in real life, there is a dispersion of potential offenders (some optimistic; some
pessimistic; some more skilled at crime than others; some more risk averse than
others), a pricing system that focuses only on the average offender will by defini-
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award in history, we gain insight into the role that wealth plays
in civil punishment.
A. The Exxon Valdez Oil Spill as a Case Study
Real world crimtorts often do not live up to the paradigmatic
ideal. The sanctions applied after the Exxon Valdez spilled 11.1
million gallons of oil into Alaska's Prince William Sound illus-
trate the unresolved problems with the crimtort paradigm.
Exxon, America's largest energy producer, caused one of the
world's greatest ecological disasters. The Exxon Valdez was "the
world's largest drunk-driving case." Exxon's conduct was found
to be reckless because Captain Hazelwood drank, left the bridge,
and failed to supervise inexperienced underlings.'97 The federal
district judge instructed the jury "that it could consider com-
pany policies on the issue of whether Hazelwood's conduct
should be imputed to Exxon."9' Exxon argued that Hazelwood
left the bridge of the Exxon Valdez in direct violation of com-
pany policy and that his conduct should not be attributed to the
firm. 9 The district court judge rejected this argument, ruling
that there was ample basis for a jury finding of Exxon's reck-
lessness.2" The jury heard evidence that "Hazelwood drank with
tion under-deter the above-average offender. The point is that, even within the
four corners of deterrence theory, there is a need to employ substantial penalties
that exceed the expected level necessary to deter the average potential offender.
Hearing Before US. Sentencing Comm'n, at 11 (New York, Oct. 1988) (statement of
John C. Coffee).
197. See Paul Reidinger, Black Gold, A.B.A. J., Feb. 1998, at 79 (previewing DAVID
LEBEDOFF, CLEANING UP: THE STORY BEHIND THE BIGGEST LEGAL BONANZA OF OUR
TIME (1998) (stating that Lebedoff "describes the Exxon Valdez matter as the 'world's
largest drunk-driving case'").
198. In re The Exxon Valdez, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12953, at *6 (D. Alaska Jan.
27, 1995).
199. See id.
200. The judge stated:
Exxon argues that Captain Hazelwood's decision to leave the bridge at 11:52 p.m.
on the night of the grounding was the only act committed by Hazelwood which
could be the legal cause of the accident. The jury heard evidence that Hazelwood,
upon electing to leave the bridge, gave Gregory Cousins certain navigation in-
strctions .... The court has reviewed all of the evidence on this issue [and found]
that .... [tihe jury could reasonably have found that it was reckless for Hazel-
wood to leave the bridge of a supertanker headed directly at a known reef only
minutes away.
In re The Exxon Valdez, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12949, at *9.
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Exxon officers and that Exxon management received reports of
Hazelwood's relapse."2 °'
The Exxon Valdez disaster was not only the largest environ-
mental crime in U.S. history-it was also America's largest
tort.2 ° The criminal fines and settlements amounted to three
and one-half years of profits from all of Exxon's American oil
and gas operations.23 The federal court remitted a $150 million
criminal fine to $25 million 2"° because Exxon had mitigated its
environmental offenses through an expensive cleanup.2 5 Exxon
was later assessed $5 billion dollars in punitive damages in a
mandatory punitive damages class action for environmental
degradation. 2  The punitive damages award is atypical because
of the unprecedented civil and criminal sanctions previously
imposed on Exxon. Exxon expended $2.1 billion in cleanup costs
and hundreds of millions of dollars in criminal and civil penal-
ties. The jury's award of $5 billion in a case of reckless conduct
dwarfs the largest punitive damage awards upheld in cases
where a firm acted intentionally or maliciously.207 Exxon cited
our previous research as evidence that a punitive damage ver-
dict in the wake of a stiff criminal fine is extremely unusual.Y8
201. Id. at *14.
202. Exxon was assessed a $25 million criminal fine, which had been remitted
from $150 million. Exxon paid $100 million in restitution to the state and federal gov-
ernments. Exxon settled natural resources claims with Alaska for $900 million. In
addition, Exxon spent $2.1 billion for cleanup expenditures. Another $304 million was
paid to settle private damage claims. Other claims included $20 million for native
subsistence claims, $287 million to fishermen, $9.7 million to a Native American cor-
poration, $46 million in casualty losses, and hundreds of millions of dollars for costs
and interest. See Exxon's Brief in Support of Motion for Judgment on Plaintiffs' Puni-
tive Damages Claims at 21 (Phase III Issues), In re The Exxon Valdez, No. A89-095
(HRH) (D. Alaska Sept. 30, 1994) [hereinafter Exxon's Briefl.
203. See id. at 23.
204. The remittance of the criminal fines has a parallel in the federal organiza-
tional sentencing guidelines. Under the guidelines, corporations may introduce
evidence of "good corporate citizenship" to mitigate punishment. See Bucy, supra note
27, at 329 (noting that companies can mitigate but not obviate punishment for proof of
good corporate citizenry, internal compliance programs to detect and correct wrong-
doing, and full cooperation with prosecutors).
205. See Transcript of Change of Plea .at 71, United States v. Exxon Corp., No.
A90-015-CR (D. Alaska Oct. 8, 1991), cited in Exxon's Brie; supra note 202.
206. See In re The Exxon Valdez, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8173 (D. Alaska June 11,
1996).
207. See supra Part III (showing that the typical multi-million dollar punitive
damage award stems from purposeful and excessive profit-seeking).
208. See Exxon's Brie; supra note 202, at 15-16 (quoting Michael Rustad & Tho-
mas Koenig, The Historical Continuity of Punitive Damages Awards: Reforming the
Tort Reformers, 42 AM. U. L. REv. 1269, 1314 (1993)).
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One might question the multi-billion dollar punitive damages
award given Exxon's prompt cleanup efforts.' ° Exxon's penalty
was based upon vicarious liability for the reckless activities of
its employees. Exxon made no attempt to cover up or deny re-
sponsibility for the disaster, unlike the typical defendant in a
business tort or products liability case.21 The company under-
took a policy review to examine the structural factors that led to
the Exxon Valdez spill.2 In this case, the private attorneys gen-
eral played an insignificant role in uncovering corporate
wrongdoing or in changing Exxon's behavior.
The Exxon Valdez case illustrates the difficulty of providing
corporate defendants with safeguards against the misuse of
wealth in setting punishment. Exxon argues that the verdict is
"a textbook example of how to appeal to a jury's prejudices" 2
and is appealing the punitive damages award on the grounds
that:
[Tihere can be no doubt that the massive verdict in this
case is solely attributable to the huge financial figures
plaintiffs paraded before the jury: no other evidence in the
209. The US. Environmental Protection Agency proposed to eliminate punitive
civil penalties for firms that voluntarily identify, disclose, and correct violations by
self-audits of their compliance with federal and state environmental requirements.
The EPA will also not recommend criminal prosecution for environmental crimes
where the firm was acting in good faith to identify, disclose and correct violations. See
Voluntary Environmental Self-Policing and Self-Disclosure Interim Policy Statement,
60 Fed. Reg. 16,875 (1995) (proposed Apr. 3, 1995).
210. In the "Dalkon Shield" litigation, high level A.H. Robins Co. executives failed
to take prompt remedial measures after learning of the dangerously defective nature
of their IUDs. Thousands of women suffered preventable life-threatening or even fatal
illnesses. The Kansas Supreme Court noted that the company deliberately and ac-
tively concealed the potential dangers of the product, thereby violating its duty to
protect the consuming public. See Tetuan v. AH. Robins Co., 738 P.2d 1210 (Kan.
1987). The asbestos punitive damages awards were based upon an entire industry's
cover-up of the then-known dangers of unprotected exposure. See, e.g., Rustad, supra
note 24, at 64-77 (documenting the systematic patterns of various corporate wrong-
doing that led to punitive damages in products liability).
211. Exxon undertook several mitigatory measures prior to the punitive damages
award. Exxon instituted alcohol abuse programs at all levels of the company,
strengthened its policy against the use of alcohol on its vessels, expanded mandatory
rest periods for its vessel officers, improved its navigation policies, reduced dangerous
routes, and developed new navigation technologies and training programs. See
Exxon's Brief supra note 202, at 25-28.
212. Id. at 62 (noting that "[pilaintiffs continually emphasized Exxon's wealth de-
scribing the multibillion-dollar criminal and remediation expenses as a 'hiccup,' and
asserting that $1 billion was 'not worth [chairman's] time.'").
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record could conceivably explain, much less justify, the
unprecedented $5 billion sanction.2"
There are three policy arguments commonly used to justify
subjecting a giant firm like Exxon to such a large punitive dam-
age award. First, fixed fines have a lesser impact on large
organizations because of the diminishing utility of money.214
Without wealth-based punitive damages, it may be cheaper to
pay cleanup costs, than to prevent future oil spills through
vigilant oversight. Second, corporate size is correlated with cor-
porate deviance.1 5 The larger the company, the greater the
difficulty it has in monitoring its agents.216 Exxon is a worldwide
firm with divisions on several continents, making effective over-
sight extremely costly. Finally, multinational corporations such
as Exxon are less susceptible to government regulation because
of their complex organization as well as their capacity to influ-
ence public policy.217
The five billion dollar punitive damages award served a social
purpose by sending a message not only to Exxon, but to the en-
tire industry, that environmental protection must be a top
priority.2 8 Exxon was certainly not crippled by the punitive
213. Id.
214. See RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 227-28, 232 & n.3 (4th ed.
1992).
215. See CLINARD & YEAGER, supra note 121, at 130 (suggesting that "the greater
numbers of violations of the larger firms may result on the whole from their greater
productive activity and the consequent increase in legal exposure").
216. Exxon invested substantial resources in fortifying its alcohol and drug policy
and other means of overseeing its employees once it faced significant potential expo-
sure to punitive damages. Large firms, in general, have many incentives not to strictly
monitor and discipline their employees. As Fisse and Braithwaite note:
A high degree of trust has been reposed in corporations to maintain internal
discipline. It is readily apparent, however, that companies have strong incen-
tives not to undertake extensive disciplinary action. In particular, a disciplinary
program may be disruptive, embarrassing for those exercising managerial con-
trol, encouraging for whistle-blowers, or hazardous in the event of civil
litigation against the company or its officers. Sometimes these incentives may
be veiled by the claim that the problem has been sufficiently investigated and
resolved by public enforcement action.
FISSE & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 114, at 9.
217. See generally DAN CLAWSON ET AL., MONEY TALKS: CORPORATE PACS AND
POLITICAL INFLUENCE (1992) (presenting results of survey of corporate executives on
the political role of large corporations); EDWIN M. EPSTEIN, THE CORPORATION IN
AMERICAN POLITICS (1969) (surveying the resources that corporations can use to in-
fluence public policy and the limitations of business power).
218. Exxon argues that "other oil companies, such as ARCO, have adopted similar
measures [of oversight]. As anyone would expect, in the face of both multi-billion dol-
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damages verdict. In 1996, Exxon was America's most profitable
corporation.219 If potential wrongdoers know that their total ex-
posure is limited to a fixed amount, there is only a limited
deterrent effect.20
Hard cases such as the Exxon Valdez litigation make bad law.
We need to examine the overall underlying patterns, not predi-
cate law reform on a single, exceptional award. We do not
abandon the criminal law because innocent defendants are oc-
casionally wrongfully convicted. The interesting empirical
question is not the aberrant case, but the typical one. The claim
that juries discriminate against the wealthy does not withstand
empirical investigation.
B. Do Juries Prefer Robin Hood or the Sheriff?
Members of the Supreme Court have expressed reservations
about the use of corporate wealth because of the possibility that
juries will vent their "raw, redistributist impulses" against
wealthy out-of-state corporations.221  Justice Sandra Day
lar criminal and civil exposure and incalculable loss of reputation, not only Exxon, but
the entire industry, has 'gotten the message.'" Exxon's Briet supra note 202, at 28.
219. See Richard Teitelbaum, Exxon: Pumping Up Profits, FORTUNE, Apr. 28, 1997,
at 134.
220. Steven Vago notes that if fines are capped at a low level "the penalty imposed
for violating the law amounts to little more than a reasonable licensing fee for en-
gaging in illegal activity. Essentially, it is worthwhile for a large corporation to violate
the laws regulating business. Typically, the fines are microscopic." VAGO, supra note 9,
at 164.
221. TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 509 US. 443, 468 (1992)
(Kennedy, J., concurring). The Court has articulated its concern over the misuse of
wealth in several recent corporate punitive damages cases. In her dissent in Pacific
Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Haslip, 499 US. 1, 43 (1991) (O'Connor, J., dissenting),
Justice Sandra Day O'Connor warned that punitive damages permit juries "to target
unpopular defendants, penalize unorthodox or controversial views, and redistribute
wealth." In an earlier case, the Court noted the danger of juries unjustly punishing
unpopular defendants: "[Since] juries assess punitive damages in wholly unpredict-
able amounts bearing no necessary relation to the actual harm caused. ... they
remain free to use their discretion selectively to punish expressions of unpopular
views." International Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. Foust, 442 U.S. 42, 51 n.14 (1979)
(quoting Gertz v. Robert Welch Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 350 (1974) (awarding punitive dam-
ages against founder of right-wing John Birch Society)) (alteration in original).
In Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 114 S. Ct. 2331 (1994), the Court held that defendants
were entitled to a meaningful post-trial judicial review of the size of a punitive dam-
age award. See id. at 2341. The plurality discussed the need for greater safeguards
against the misuse of wealth in setting the level of corporate punishment: "ITihe rise
of large, interstate and multinational corporations has aggravated the problem of
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O'Connor noted the unfairness that might result from the intro-
duction of corporate wealth into the punitive damages equation:
Courts have long recognized that juries may view large
corporations with great disfavor. Corporations are mere
abstractions and, as such, are unlikely to be viewed with
much sympathy. Moreover, they often represent a large
accumulation of productive resources; jurors naturally
think little of taking an otherwise large sum of money out
of what appears to be an enormously larger pool of
wealth. Finally, juries may feel privileged to correct per-
ceived social ills stemming from unequal wealth
distribution by transferring money from "wealthy" corpo-
rations to comparatively needier plaintiffs.
22
Tort reformers argue that the consideration of the defendant's
wealth discriminates against corporate defendants. 2' They
charge that wealth-sensitive remedies create class hostility by
arbitrary awards and potentially biased juries. Punitive damages pose an acute dan-
ger of arbitrary deprivation of property." Id. at 2340.
In another recent punitive damage case, the Supreme Court set aside a $2 million pu-
nitive damages verdict as so grossly excessive as to violate the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. See BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 116 S. Ct. 1589, 1604 (1996).
The BMW Court reasoned, in part, that the ratio of punitive damages to compensatory
damages is a relevant factor in determining whether a given award is so excessive as to
violate a defendant's constitutional rights. See id. at 1601-03. However, the Court re-
fused to draw a "mathematical bright line between the constitutionally acceptable and
the constitutionally unacceptable." Id. at 1602 (quoting Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v.
Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 18 (1990)); see also infra notes 267-69.
Earlier decisions also expressed the Court's concern over standardless punitive
damages against corporations. See, e.g., Browning-Ferris Indus., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal,
Inc., 492 U.S. 257 (1989) (Brennan, J., concurring) (noting that juries are given little
guidance in awarding punitive damages).
222. TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 490-91 (1993)
(O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
223. "According to this view, everything else being equal, injured parties are more
likely to blame and sue deep-pocket targets; attorneys are more likely to accept cases
against deep-pocket targets; and juries are more likely to find liability, and award
more money, when cases involve deep-pocket defendants." Amicus Curiae Brief for
The American Automobile Manufacturers Association et al. in Support of Respondent,
BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 116 S. Ct. 1589 (1996) (No. 94-896). Neil K. Komesar
summarizes the attack on the consideration of wealth: "Critics argue that juries grant
awards to plaintiffs against 'deep pockets,' merely because 'deep pockets' are wealthy.
This is said to epitomize the jury's disregard for legal rules, irrational sympathy for
injured plaintiffs, and antipathy to large enterprises and other wealthy defendants."
NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN LAW,
ECONOMICS AND PUBLIC POLICY 187 n.62 (1994). But see Robert J. MacCoun, Differen-
tial Treatment of Corporate Defendants by Juries: An Examination of the Deep Pockets
Hypothesis, 30 LAW & SOC'Y REv. 148, 150 (1996) (concluding that there is little evi-
dence of a defendant wealth effect on juror judgments).
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bringing a "politics of resentment into the courtroom."A In re-
sponse to these concerns, the vast majority of states have
recently enacted one or more restrictions on the use of wealth in
calibrating civil punishment.2'
Gary Schwartz argues that "the 'wealth of the defendant'
bears no obvious relationship to deterrence goals .... If the di-
minishing utility of money reduces the rich defendant's 'real'
liability costs, it equally reduces the risk-prevention costs the
defendant would need to incur." "26 In contrast, Richard Posner
counters that punitive damages are necessary "to make sure
that people channel transactions through the market when the
costs of voluntary transactions are low. We do not want a person
to be able to take his neighbor's car and when the neighbor
complains tell him to go sue for its value."'
No empirical research exists to resolve the dispute over the
deterrent power of punitive damages. However, as Dan Dobbs
notes, "[it is indeed true that deterrence has not been proven to
be effective in the case of punitive damages, but neither has it
been proven effective in the case of orthodox criminal penal-
ties."2 Most empirical research of punitive damages verdicts
has centered on whether juries unfairly exercise their power
with the result that they destroy corporations.2 9 The existing
224. Abraham & Jeffries, supra note 26, at 424 (arguing that "[r]etribution is the
only plausible justification for considering the defendant's wealth in awarding puni-
tive damages"); see also Michael McKee, Concealing the Company Assets, LEGAL
TIMES, Apr. 3, 1995, at 5 (quoting Shirley Hufstedler, former federal appeals court
judge and now counsel to Dow Coming, that "the size of the [company's] purse does
not measure how badly damaged the plaintiff was").
225. See Thomas Koenig & Michael Rustad, The Quiet Revolution Revisited: An
Empirical Study of the Impact of State 7brt Reform of Punitive Damages in Products
Liability, 16 JuST. SYS. J. 21, 23 (1993).
226. Schwartz, supra note 26, at 140.
227. Kemezy v. Peters, 79 F.3d 33, 34 (7th Cir. 1996). Further, Richard Posner ar-
gues: "[If the shareholders bear no responsibility for a manager's crime they will have
every incentive to hire managers willing to commit crimes on the corporation's be-
half" RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 398 (3rd ed. 1986).
228. DOBBS, supra note 134, § 3.9, at 220.
229. In Berry v. Loiseau, 614 A.2d 414, 427 (Conn. 1992), the Connecticut Supreme
Court noted that a large punitive damage award is not necessarily discriminatory:
The size of the verdict alone does not determine whether it is excessive. The
only practical test to apply ... is whether the award falls somewhere within
the necessarily uncertain limits of just damages or whether the size of the
verdict so shocks the sense of justice as to compel the conclusion that the
jury was influenced by partiality, prejudice, mistake or corruption.... Every
reasonable presumption in favor of the correctness of the court's refusal to
set aside the verdict as excessive should be indulged ... and its ruling will
not be disturbed unless there is a clear abuse of discretion.
Id. at 427 (omissions in original).
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scientific studies suggest that the remedy of punitive damages
is not being systematically misused." ° Further research is
needed, but there is little empirical evidence showing a need to
remove wealth from the civil punishment equation.
Some critics complain "that juries harbor a consistent bias
against wealthy and insured defendants and that a difference in
the parties' financial status creates a 'Robin Hood like state of
mind in the jury room."2"1 Recent social psychological research
finds no evidence that juries are unfavorably disposed toward
corporations."' For example, one study concluded:
[Jiurors were suspicious of the legitimacy of plaintiffs'
claims and concerned about the personal and social costs
230. Ermann and Lundman argue that firms are being underdeterred by corpo-
rate fines:
For the most part, these financial penalties fail to exceed or even equal the
gains from corporate violations of the law. Thus, the Sentencing Commission
found that federal courts fined only two corporations in its sample more than
$500,000. The average fine was $141,000.
This is a lot of money for most individuals, but it is insignificant for most corpo-
rations. To get a sense of the impact of an average fine for a corporation, we
calculated the equivalent fine for a person earning $35,000. If a "small" corpora-
tion with annual sales of $500 million-a firm approximately one-tenth the size
of Apple Computer-were fined $141,000, it would be the equivalent of $10 for a
person earning $35,000.
M. David Ermann & Richard J. Lundman, Corporate and Governmental Deviance, in
CORPORATE AND GOVERNMENTAL DEVIANCE: PROBLEMS OF ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR
IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY, supra note 99, at 3, 40.
231. Alan Howard Scheiner, Judicial Assessment of Punitive Damages: The Sev-
enth Amendment and the Politics of Jury Power, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 142, 164 (1991)
(citing [FIRST NAME] Dubois, Punitive Damages in Personal Injury, Products Liability
and Professional Cases: Bonanza or Disaster, 43 INS. COuNS. J. 344, 351 (1976)). Pro-
fessor David Owen argues that considering corporate wealth results in unjustly large
awards:
"[W]ealth" no longer serves as a clearly limiting factor on the range of jury dis-
cretion. Instead, a jury instructed to use the "wealth" of a multi-million or
multi-billion corporation as a yardstick in assessing punitive damages is almost
forced to think in terms of seven figures ... or eight figures ... or nine fig-
ures....
Owen, supra note 98, at 45-46; see also Abraham & Jeffries, supra note 26, at 416-20
(arguing a tendency for juries to discriminate against large corporations to ensure ad
hoc redistributions of wealth).
232. See Edith Greene et al., Jurors'Attitudes About Civil Litigation and the Size
of Damage Awards, 40 AM. U. L. REV. 805, 814-15 (1991); Neil Vidmar, Empirical
Evidence on the Deep Pockets Hypothesis: Jury Awards for Pain and Suffering in
Medical Malpractice Cases, 43 DUKE L.J. 217 (1993).
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of large jury awards. Despite insistence on product safety
and high expectations of business, jurors were generally
favorable toward business, skeptical more about the profit
motives of individual plaintiffs than of business defen-
dants, and committed to holding down awards."
RAND investigated the "widely held view that juries are bi-
ased against wealthy 'deep-pocket' defendants" with jury
simulations.34 Its study, which is consistent with all other em-
pirical research,25 in casting doubt on the deep-pocket
hypothesis."
C. Awards Are Correlated With Plaintiff's Injury
RAND's Institute for Civil Justice discovered that corpora-
tions are more likely than individuals or public agencies to be
assessed the largest punitive damages awards. 7 Theodore Eis-
enberg and his Cornell University colleagues reported a similar
finding "that mean punitive damages awards are in fact higher
in cases involving business defendants than in cases involving
individual defendants, a result confirmed by RAND's find-
ings."
238
233. Valerie P Hans & William S. Lofquist, Jurors' Judgments of Business Liabil-
ity in 7brt Cases: Implications for the Litigation Explosion Debate, 26 L. & SOc'y REv.
85, 93 (1992) (concluding that "tort jurors had strong negative views about the fre-
quency and legitimacy of civil lawsuits," and finding little evidence of tough standards
and punitiveness by jurors toward corporations). Hans and Lofquist report public
opposition to the use of wealth in punitive damages. Jurors believe that an
"organization's assets should not be and were not relevant to the liability and award
decisions." Id. at 106.
234. See generally MacCoun, supra note 223.
235. See generally Valerie P. Hans, The Jury's Response to Business and Corporate
Wrongdoing, 52 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 177 (1989); Vidmar, supra note 232.
236. See generally MacCoun, supra note 223.
237. See PETERSON ET AL., supra note 93, at 49-50. RAND concluded that
"[plunitive [damages] awards against businesses were far larger than those against
individuals in both personal injury and business/contract cases .... " Id. at 50. See
generally AUDREY CHIN & MARK A. PETERSON, DEEP POCKETS, EMPTY POCKETS: WHO
WINS IN COOK COUNTY JURY TRIALS? (1985).
238. Theodore Eisenberg et al., The Predictability of Punitive Damages, 26 J.
LEGAL STUD. 623, 640 (1997). The mean punitive damages award when an individual
sued another individual was $279,415 (67 cases). The mean verdict was $817,230
when an individual was awarded punitive damages against a corporation. The mean
punitive damages award was $515,666 in business versus business lawsuits. See
PETERSON ETAL., supra note 93, at 14.
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But higher awards assessed against business organizations
provide no evidence that juries are anti-corporate since:
The punishment/deterrent rationale, when implemented
through monetary sanctions, suggests fine-tuning to reflect
the defendant's financial circumstances. A police officer
who unlawfully beats a victim may be severely punished,
and other police officers deterred, by a punitive award of
$5,000. A multi-billion dollar corporation may not even
notice such an award. We thus expect the level of the
award to reflect the defendant's financial situation. In-
creased award levels against wealthier defendants,
therefore, do not necessarily show bias against them. 9
The size of punitive damage awards against firms is more
closely correlated with the damages inflicted than with the
wealth of the corporate defendant." ° The larger awards against
business defendants appear to result principally from the
greater injuries inflicted by corporations.2"
D. A Secondary Analysis of Million Dollar Awards
To learn more about the relationship between wealth and
civil punishment, we conducted a secondary analysis of punitive
damages awards of $1 million or more upheld in federal courts
between 1984 and 1994.2 The rarity of multimiion-dollar pu-
nitive damage awards upheld in federal courts is in itself a
striking finding. The federal courts of the fifty states upheld
only thirty-four punitive damage awards of $1 million or more
239. PETERSON ET AL., supra note 93 at 5.
240. Marc Galanter & David Luban, Poetic Justice: Punitive Damages and Legal
Pluralism, 42 Am. U. L. REV. 1393, 1439 (1993) (citing study by Joan T. Schmit et al.,
Punitive Damages: Punishment or Further Compensation?, 55 J. RISK & INS. 453, 463
(1988)).
241. See Rustad, supra note 24, at 63 tbl. 20 (finding that median punitive dam-
ages award in products liability litigation was directly related to severity of the
plaintiff's injury).
242. The Exxon study was devised to buttress the firm's argument that the $5 bil-
lion punitive damages awarded in the Exxon Valdez case was excessive and out of
proportion with past decided federal cases. The only cases Exxon excluded were
awards where the net worth and net income figures were unavailable. For insurance
companies, net worth amount represents "policyholders surplus" and net income rep-
resents "net operating income." For other companies, net worth represents
"stockholders' equity." Otherwise, "figures were obtained from judicial opinion."
Exxon's Brief, supra note 202, at app. (Table of Punitive Damage Awards).
WINTER 1998]
340 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 31:2
243over the decade-fewer than four of these verdicts per year.
Nine other recent empirical studies have also found that large
punitive damage awards against corporations are quite infre-
quent.2"
Our examination of the factual foundations underlying these
large punitive damage awards reveals that most grew out of
business disputes. Intentional torts or fraud in a business con-
text accounted for the great majority of multimillion-dollar
punitive verdicts.245 Twenty-six of the awards grew out of eco-
nomic loss litigation which involved business torts, contract
breaches, or libel. Only eight of the upheld million dollar awards
arose out of personal injury, a finding which undermines the ar-
gument that juries are redistributing corporate wealth to
injured local residents.4 6 If there is a punitive damages prob-
lem, it comes not from David suing Goliath, but Goliath suing
Goliath.2'7
We analyzed the size, frequency, and underlying factual foun-
dations of the thirty-four upheld cases to determine the
relationship between wealth and punishment. While a few cases
resulted in corporate defendants becoming virtually bankrupt,
most corporate defendants were punished only slightly in view
243. Our analysis discovered that the largest awards upheld by the federal courts
of appeals were punitive damages arising out of business disputes, commercial con-
tracts, and intentional torts. Punitive damages in products liability, medical
malpractice, and personal injury-the areas targeted by tort reformers-are under-
represented in Exxon's sample of million dollar plus awards.
244. See Michael Rustad, Nationalizing Tort Law: The Republicans' War Against
Women, Blue Collar Workers and Consumers, 48 RUTGERS L. REV. 673, 689-704
(1996). In the most recent of the nine studies, the Justice Department found punitive
damages to be rare in its survey of 762,000 cases in the 75 most populous counties of
the United States. See CAROL DEFRANCES ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CIVIL JURY
CASES AND VERDICTS IN LARGE COUNTIES 1-6 (1995). Plaintiffs were awarded punitive
damages in only six percent of the cases they won. See id. at 6. Plaintiffs received over
$50,000 in merely half of the successful verdicts. See id. at 5. Punitive damages ac-
counted for only about one tenth of all money awarded to plaintiffs. See id. at 6.
245. See Exxon's Brief, supra note 202, at 15.
246. The belief that the introduction of evidence of a defendant's wealth will lead
to biased awards is long-standing. See Clarence Morris, Punitive Damages in Tort
Cases, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1173, 1191 (1931) (arguing that "lilt is a good guess that rich
men do not fare well before juries, and the more emphasis placed on their riches, the
less well they fare"). Contemporary critics assert that the use of wealth encourages
juries to unfairly redistribute power from corporations to plaintiffs and their attor-
neys. See Abraham & Jeffries, supra note 26, at 424, for an argument that punitive
damages unfairly tempt the jury "to ad hoc redistribution of wealth."
247. See generally Michael Rustad, Unraveling Punitive Damages: Current Data
and Further Inquiry (paper presented at the National Conference on the Future of
Punitive Damages, University of Wisconsin-Madison Law School, Oct. 25, 1996).
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of their size and the gravity of their offense.2 8 These punitive
damage awards were typically well within the defendant's abil-
ity to pay as presented in Table Three below. Only five of the
awards in the sample exceeded one percent of the defendant's
net worth.249
TABLE THREE:
ANALYSIS OF PAST FEDERAL CASES OF PUNITIVE
DAMAGES OF $1 MILLION OR MORE UPHELD
IN FEDERAL COURTS, 1984-1994
MEDIAN MEAN MEDIAN OF MEAN OF NET
PERCENTAGE PERCENTAGE NET INCOME INCOME
OF NET OF NET
WORTH WORTH
.3 of one 1.915 percent 3 percent 7.43 percent
percent
Table Three shows that the median punitive damages award
upheld was 0.3% of the firm's net worth.250 A fraction of one per-
cent of a firm's net worth may be a substantial amount of money
but does not threaten a firm's solvency. This database of upheld
awards includes large awards that were reversed or remitted by
trial and appellate judges." 1
248. The upheld punitive damage awards ranged from 0.19% to 74% of the net in-
come of defendants. This is a wide variation, but most awards were commensurate
with the defendant's wealth. Judicial review is warranted where punitive damages
constitute 74% of a firm's net income or are otherwise disproportionate to a firm's
ability to pay.
249. None of these were personal injury cases. Four of these verdicts arose out of
business disputes and the remaining one from nuisance litigation.
250. There is no evidence in this data to suggest that juries discriminate against
deep pocket corporations in favor of injured plaintiffs. Personal injury cases tended to
be smaller, with a median of less than 0.2% of corporate net worth. This finding shows
that the tort reform debate may be misdirected. Business contracts or torts appear to
be the major source of large punitive damage awards.
251. Our earlier study of punitive damages in product liability found that half of
all awards were remitted or reversed in the post-verdict period. See Rustad, supra
note 24, at 51-58. Even some of the upheld million dollar awards had been reduced by
reviewing courts. Eight of these 34 million dollar awards were remitted or reduced by
the trial or appellate court. This pattern is evidence of the strict scrutiny that courts
apply to large punitive damage awards.
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In sharp contrast to the nineteenth century, when reversals
for misuse of evidence of corporate wealth were quite common,
improper references to the wealth of the defendant were not an
issue in these cases. In fact, in the full decade examined, no fed-
eral appeals court has reduced an award because of a plaintiff's
improper references to the defendant's wealth."2
Our empirical research suggests that wealth-calibrated puni-
tive damages are not out of control. Our findings corroborate the
results of previous research which shows that corporations are
not being bankrupted by misuses of civil punishment."3 Further
empirical research on the "crimtorts in action" is needed to dis-
cover the functions and dysfunctions of this emergent third
paradigm of civil punishment.
All of the empirical evidence leads to one firm conclusion. The
emergent crimtort remedy of punitive damages is functioning
well. However, the fact that the great majority of verdicts are
reasonably based is of little solace to a crimtort defendant such
as Exxon. This section proposes a procedural framework for the
fair prosecution of offenses lying in the borderland. Rather than
eliminating punitive damages or imposing unworkable criminal
procedural standards, we propose developing intermediate pro-
tection that is tailored to the nature of this hybrid.
V. PROPOSALS FOR REFORM OF CRIMTORTS IN THE COURTS
A. Enforcement by Private Attorneys General
One of the distinctive features of crimtorts is enforcement by
private attorneys general.25 Public authorities played little or no
252. Cf Dunn v. Hovic, 1 F.3d 1371 (3d Cir. 1993) (rejecting the asbestos manufac-
turer's contention that the closing argument by plaintiff's counsel used wealth in a
prejudicial manner); Emery-Waterhouse Co. v. Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Nat'l Bank,
757 F.2d 399 (1st Cir. 1985) (rejecting defense argument that improper appeal to
wealth led to large punitive damages award).
253. See Rustad, supra note 247, at 3-23 (summarizing nine empirical research
studies confirming that punitive damages are rare and closely supervised by judicial
review).
254. The use of wealth is the key to creating optimal incentives for the "private
attorneys general." The private attorney general is a trial lawyer who brings an action
on behalf of the larger society as well as her client. In products liability litigation, the
private attorney general role was key in uncovering a variety of dangerously defective
products including the Ford Pinto, the CJ-7 Jeep, Copper-Seven intrauterine devices,
and asbestos. See generally Rustad, supra note 24. In the field of medical malpractice,
private attorneys general uncovered deplorable conditions in several corporate nurs-
ing home chains. See, e.g., Harmon v. Gilsan Care Center, Inc., No. 8111-07085
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role in uncovering the misconduct that led to hundreds of puni-
tive damage awards in products liability55 and medical
malpractice lawsuits.5 6  The punitive damages settlement
against the chemical companies who polluted Love Canal257 and
the verdict against Kerr-McGee in the famous Silkwood case
provide dramatic examples of the public interest being served
by the work of private attorneys general.25s
B. Intermediate Procedural Protection for Crimtorts
Crimtort penalties are typically imposed for aggravated mis-
conduct far beyond negligence, but less than the intentional
misconduct characteristic of criminal punishment. Here, the dif-
ficult policy choice is whether to adopt civil or criminal
procedures for a crimtort trial. In this Section, we propose pro-
cedural protection midway between criminal and civil
safeguards.259
(Multnomah County Cir. Ct., Or. Aug. 6, 1982) (assessing punitive damages for nurs-
ing home neglect of 90-year-old resident). Florida passed a statute providing for
punitive damages explicitly to create incentives for lawyers to represent elderly
nursing home residents. See Rustad & Koenig, supra note 33, at 1034 n.198 (1995).
255. See generally Rustad, supra note 24.
256. See generally Rustad & Koenig, supra note 33, at 1081-82.
257. See generally Robert Emmet Hernan, A State's Right to Recover Punitive
Damages in a Public Nuisance Action: The Love Canal Case Study, 1 TOURO ENVTL.
L.J. 45 (1994). The settlement which included punitive damages in the Love Canal
litigation sent a clear message to the entire chemical industry that the indiscriminate
dumping of toxic waste was a violation of the public trust that could result in severe
punishment. The state of New York, one of the plaintiffs, was found to be entitled to
seek punitive damages through a public nuisance action. The case settled before it
could be determined whether the state could collect punitive damages on behalf of
citizens harmed by the antisocial conduct of the chemical companies.
258. The typical toxic torts case involves a private plaintiff functioning as a pri-
vate attorney general, as in Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238 (1984). Before
her death, Karen Silkwood uncovered a pattern of unsafe workplace practices in a
Kerr-McGee plutonium plant in Cimarron, Oklahoma. The attorneys for her estate
proved that Kerr-McGee's safety policies were so lackadaisical that the firm could not
account for several pounds of missing plutonium. An Oklahoma jury awarded the
estate $10 million in punitive damages to punish and deter Kerr-McGee's reckless
indifference to the public safety. See Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 769 F.2d 1451,
1455 (10th Cir. 1985) (describing defendant's operations as manifesting a lackadaisical
attitude toward health and safety).
259. See Lyndon F. Biddle, Comment, Punitive Damages and the Eighth Amend-
ment: An Analytical Framework for Determining Excessiveness, 75 CAL. L. REV. 1433,
1458 (1987) ("The defendant's wealth is relevant only to the harshness side of the
proportion, not to the wrongfulness side, and the danger of jury prejudice arises when
this distinction gets blurred.").
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Common law tort remedies afford the defendant too few safe-
guards, while criminal law is too blunt of an instrument.2" A
corporation has no right to privacy'61 or any Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination,262 but it is entitled to due
process.2" The Supreme Court in United States v. Hudson re-
cently decided an issue relevant to crimtort jurisprudence:
whether people fined by federal agencies for wrongdoing can
also be criminally prosecuted for the same misdeeds.2" The
Court held that the double jeopardy clause is not a bar to a later
criminal prosecution because the governmental fine was civil
not criminal. This difficult double jeopardy issue often arises
where conduct lies on the borderline between crime and tort.
The culpability standard for punitive damages varies from ju-
risdiction to jurisdiction.2" Although civil defendants have no
constitutional right to notice of whether their behavior will re-
sult in civil punishment, notice is "[olne of the most important
260. See Susan W. Brenner, Civil Complicity: Using the Pinkerton Doctrine to Im-
pose Vicarious Liability in Civil RICO Actions, 81 KY. L.J. 369, 405 (1993) (arguing
that tort analogies are inappropriate due to different policy considerations underlying
criminal and civil penalties).
261. See United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632 (1950).
262. See Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 384-85 (1911).
263. See Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 114 S. Ct. 2331, 2332 (1994) (holding that cor-
porate defendant was entitled to post-verdict review for excessiveness of punitive
damage award as a matter of procedural due process); BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore,
116 S. Ct. 1589, 1591, 1598 (1996) (holding that punitive damages award against cor-
porate defendant violated substantive due process).
264. 118 S. Ct. 1488 (1997).
265. David Owen observes that "vagueness is an inherent and necessary aspect of
punitive damage standards." David G. Owen, A Punitive Damages Overview: Func-
tions, Problems and Reform, 39 VILL. L. REv. 363, 384 (1994).
The American Bar Association's Litigation Section has divided punitive damage li-
ability standards into four general clusters:
(1). The intent or scienter nucleus: intentional, willful, deliberate, knowing, con-
scious design, plan or purpose or consequences; (2). The bad motive or state of
mind nucleus: malice (real), hatred, ill will, spite, anger, revenge, evil intent,
moral turpitude, fraud, oppression, vexatious annoyance, and insulting behav-
ior; (3). A test based upon conduct seen objectively as warranting punitive
damages: outrageous misconduct or conduct beyond the bounds of decency, fla-
grant misconduct; and (4). The nucleus of more than negligence but less than
intent: wanton, reckless (indifference) to consequences, implied malice, gross
negligence, heedless and an entire want of care (or used no care).
AMERICAN BAR Ass'N SECTION OF LITIG., PuNrrIvE DAMAGES: A CONSTRUCTIVE
EXAMINATION 34 tbl. 1 (1986).
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requirements of a legal system... that the law be clear and cer-
tain., 2
The Supreme Court has begun to articulate intermediate pro-
cedural protection for corporate defendants reviewing the
excessiveness of punitive damage awards in four recent cases.267
In BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore,26 the Court established
"three guideposts" which, in effect, give defendants fair notice
that they may be subject to punitive damages.2 69 The model pro-
posed by this Article is consistent with the Court's continuing
concern for due process guarantees for punitive damage defen-
dants. Accordingly, this Article recommends adoption of the
defendant's right to bifurcated proceedings, of the heightened
burden of proof of clear and convincing evidence, of a crimtort
liability standard of "reckless indifference to the rights of oth-
ers," and of protection against overkill from repeated
punishment for the same acts. The intermediate regime of crim-
torts should apply to the trial of all civil punishments, which
include punitive damages, multiple statutory damages and
quasi-criminal fines.
1. Bifurcation-Many states require that punitive damages
proceedings be divided into two phases, the determination of
liability and the punitive damages phase-a procedure that re-
sembles criminal sentencing. In criminal cases, judges consider
a broad range of aggravating and mitigating factors to deter-
mine the proper sentence, but only after the jury has rendered
its verdict of guilt. The first stage of a bifurcated crimtort trial
determines all of the compensatory damages issues and estab-
266. SPECIAL COMM. ON THE TORT LIAB. Sys., TOWARDS A JURISPRUDENCE OF
INJURY: THE CONTINUING CREATION OF A SYSTEM OF SUBSTANTIVE JUSTICE IN
AMERICAN TORT LAW 2-23 (1984).
267. The Court in Pacific Mutual Insurance Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 34 (1991), ob-
served that Alabama's exclusion of wealth from consideration in determining the
amount of punitive damages was a key variable in the "constitutional calculus" that
was upheld in that case. In TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 509 U.S. 443,
464 (1993), Justice Stevens noted that the "emphasis on the wealth of the wrongdoer
increase[s] the risk ... that [punitive damage] award[s] may ... [be] influenced by
prejudice against large corporations, a risk that is of special concern when the defen-
dant is a nonresident." The Court held that defendants were entitled to a post-verdict
excessiveness review in Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 114 S. Ct. 2331 (1994). Most re-
cently, in BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 116 S. Ct. 1589 (1996), the U.S.
Supreme Court found a high ratio punitive damages award excessive as a matter of
substantive due process.
268. 116 S. Ct. 1589 (1996).
269. The three guideposts are the degree of reprehensibility of the conduct, the
ratio between the actual or potential harm suffered and the punitive damages award,
and the difference between civil penalties authorized or imposed and the punitive
damages award. See 116 S. Ct. at 1598-99.
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lishes whether punitive damages are to be assessed."' The sec-
ond phase of the trial is limited to the single issue of the amount
of punitive damages necessary to punish the defendant appro-
priately.27 1 In the absence of bifurcation, factors such as the
defendant's prior bad acts and the wealth of the defendant-
which are relevant only to punitive damages-might contami-
nate the compensatory stage.272 Compulsory bifurcation should
be ordered at the request of the defendant or at the discretion
of the trial judge in all civil punishment litigation.273
2. "Clear and Convincing Evidence"--While the ordinary
burden of proof in civil litigation is "preponderance of the evi-
dence," the criminal standard requires "beyond a reasonable
doubt." The crimtort paradigm should follow the de facto stan-
dard of "clear and convincing evidence" that has evolved in
270. The purpose of the bifurcated proceeding is to prevent prejudice against the
defendant. In Stage I of a bifurcated trial, all evidence of aggravated misconduct and
of the defendant's finances are excluded. Stage I determines the defendant's liability
and whether punishment should be imposed. In Stage II, the level of punitive dam-
ages is set based upon wealth of the defendant, aggravating circumstances, and
mitigating circumstances.
Section 11 of NCCUSL's Model Punitive Damages Act provides for the bifurcated trial
of punitive damage claims. The Act creates separate proceedings for the adjudication of
the amount of punitive damages. See MODEL PUNITIVE DAMAGES ACT § 11 (1996).
271. For example, in California, the court "shall, on application of any defendant,
preclude the admission of evidence of that defendant's profits or financial condition
until after the trier of fact returns a verdict for plaintiff awarding actual damages and
finds that a defendant is guilty of malice, oppression, or fraud"; evidence of profit and
financial condition "shall be admissible only as to the defendant or defendants found
to be liable to the plaintiff and to be guilty of malice, oppression, or fraud." Such evi-
dence "shall be presented to the same trier of fact that found for the plaintiff and
found one or more defendants guilty of malice, oppression, or fraud." CAL. CIV. CODE
§ 3295(d) (West 1997); see also CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-240b (West 1991) (stating
that "[i]f the trier of fact determines that punitive damages should be awarded [in a
products liability action], the court shall determine the amount of such damages not
to exceed an amount equal to twice the damages awarded to the plaintiff'); GA. CODE
ANN. § 51-12-5.1(d)(1)-(2) (Supp. 1997) ("In any case in which punitive damages are
claimed, the trier of fact shall first resolve from the evidence produced at trial
whether an award of punitive damages shall be made .... If it is found that punitive
damages are to be awarded, the trial shall immediately be recommenced in order to
receive such evidence as is relevant to a decision regarding what amount of damages
will be sufficient to deter, penalize, or punish the defendant in light of the circum-
stances of the case. It shall then be the duty of the trier of fact to set the amount to be
awarded.").
272. See Koenig & Rustad, supra note 225, at 28 (reporting that twelve states re-
quire bifurcated punitive damages trials).
273. See Foreword to Symposium on Civil Justice Reform, 42 AM. U L. REV. 1245,
1250 (1993) (noting that "reformers argue that punitive damages punish defendants
without employing the procedural safeguards of criminal law, thereby blurring the
distinction between public and private law").
"Crimtorts" as Corporate Just Deserts
many states.274 This heightened standard of proof for civil pun-
ishment is formal recognition that all remedies for crimtorts
involve potentially stigmatizing punishment.
3. Clarifying Jury Instructions-Crimtort defendants com-
plain that juries are given inadequate instructions as to the
conduct which constitutes punishable behavior. Criminal law, in
contrast, contains clear descriptions of the elements of each of-
fense and provides advance notice of the consequences. Crimtort
defendants may not be entitled to the kind of notice accorded
criminal defendants. It is neither possible nor desirable to enu-
merate all of the quasi-criminal misconduct that is potentially
subject to civil punishment but crimtort defendants are entitled
to notice of the general state of mind warranting punishment.
Judicial recognition of the crimtort paradigm will result in
improved jury instructions. An explicit explanation of the hybrid
nature of crimtort remedies would clarify the rationale for civil
punishment. A review of the social functions of crimtorts would
aid the jury in determining when civil punishment should be
imposed. Juries should be instructed as to both the aggravating
and mitigating circumstances, as well as the defendant's wealth,
as guides to settling the appropriate level of punishment. Ex-
amples of aggravating -circumstances would include
concealment and the cover-up of similar incidents. Mitigating
factors would include prompt remedial action and the adoption
of oversight procedures to guard against the repetition of the
bad behavior.
One of the key policy decisions is to determine which mental
state is appropriate for civil punishment. Punitive damages
standards vary widely from gross negligence to intentional mis-
conduct.27 Civil punishment requires that a defendant have a
mental state that goes beyond mere negligence.276 The punitive
274. See Koenig & Rustad, supra note 225, at 27 (reporting that 26 jurisdictions
now require a plaintiff to prove punitive damages by at least clear and convincing
evidence).
275. See RICHARD L. BLArr ET AL., PuNrrvE DAMAGES: A STATE-BY-STATE GUIDE
TO LAW AND PRACTICE § 8.2, at 114-15 (1991) (documenting that the punitive damages
liability standard varies by state from gross negligence to malice).
276. Prosser notes the intermediate nature of punitive damages:
Something more than the mere commission of a tort is always required for pu-
nitive damages. There must be circumstances of aggravation or outrage, such
as spite or "malice," or a fraudulent or evil motive on the part of the defendant,
or such a conscious and deliberate disregard of the interests of others that the
conduct may be called willful or wanton.
KEETON ETAL., supra note 40, § 2, at 9-10.
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liability standard lies "between intent to do harm ... and the
mere unreasonable risk of harm to another involved in ordinary
negligence."277 The Supreme Court in BMW of America, Inc. v.
Gore27 noted that punitive damages is reserved for conduct
"more reprehensible than negligence."279
The malice standard employed by some jurisdictions is inap-
propriate as a measure of corporate misconduct. ° Product
manufacturers bear no ill-will toward their customers; they
harm them through reckless indifference. 1 The standard of
reckless indifference lies below intentional conduct that is not
measured by the defendant's unreasonableness but by the
higher standard of systematic indifference to the public welfare.
The reckless indifference standard harmonizes with the puni-
tive liability standard many states are already adopting. 2
4. Safeguarding Against Overkill-Punitive damages are an
appropriate reward for the attorneys who uncover the smoking
guns that lead to the first awards, but this is not a compelling
justification for the fiftieth or hundredth case using these same
documents. Tobacco, asbestos, and silicone breast implants are
recent examples of mass torts possessing the potential to bank-
rupt companies. While corporations need protection against
being subject to repeated civil punishment arising out of the
same conduct or act,m in mass tort cases, late coming plaintiffs
need some assurance that the cupboard will not be left bare by
earlier multimillion-dollar claimants.'
277. WIJAM PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 34, at 184-85 (4th ed. 1971).
278. 116 S. Ct. 1589, 1599 (1996).
279. Id. at 1598-99.
280. See Rawlings v. Apodaca, 726 P.2d 565, 578 (Ariz. 1986) (stating that malice
warranting punitive damages occurs when the "defendant's evil hand was guided by
an evil mind").
281. See Michael Rustad & Thomas Koenig, The Historical Continuity of Punitive
Damages Awards: Reforming the Tbrt Reformers, 42 AM. U L. REV. 1269, 1279 n.64
(1993).
282. See BLArr ET AL., supra note 275, § 3.2, at 58 (citing 23 states where conduct
is "more culpable than gross negligence").
283. The overkill problem predicted by Judge Friendly in Roginsky v. Richardson-
Merrell, Inc., 378 F.2d 832, 839, 841 (2d Cir. 1967) has not materialized. In the case of
MER-29, there were only three punitive damages awards out of thousands of claims.
There were only eleven punitive damage awards in the Dalkon Shield litigation, even
though the victims numbered over 200,000. Similarly, there have been fewer than 25
punitive damages awards in a decade of breast implant cases. We base these findings
on a computer run of the authors' nationwide database of punitive damages in product
liability. For a description of this database, see Rustad, supra note 24, at 32-36.
284. See Findley v. Blinken (In re Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig.), 129 B.R. 710,
751 (E. & S.D.N.Y. 1991) (concluding that one failure of the system is that future
claims may lead to the insolvency of many companies).
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The overkill problem requires a solution in harmony with the
intermediate nature of crimtorts. Criminal defendants have pro-
tection against double jeopardy. Tort law imposes no limitations
on multiple lawsuits arising out of the same act. The intermedi-
ate approach would be to treat every mass crimtort as a limited
pool rather than to create an arbitrary civil double jeopardy
rule.2" Proof of prior punitive damages should be admissible to
show that a corporate defendant has been punished suffi-
ciently.2 86 Another policy alternative to the overkill problem is to
place some arbitrary limit on the percentage of net income or
net worth that can be assessed in repeated cases of civil pun-
ishment for the same act. Punitive damage class action lawsuits
are a possible solution to the problem of overkill.
5. Post-Verdict Reviews for Excessiveness-Heightened judi-
cial review of crimtort verdicts will minimize any possible
prejudice against corporate defendants. The Supreme Court in
Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 87 held that punitive damages defen-
dants are entitled to a post-verdict judicial review for
excessiveness. The Oberg Court stated:
Punitive damages pose an acute danger of arbitrary dep-
rivation of property. Jury instructions typically leave the
jury with wide discretion in choosing amounts, and the
presentation of a defendant's net worth creates the poten-
tial that juries will use their verdicts to express biases
against big businesses, particularly those without strong
local presences. Judicial review of the amount awarded
285. See Jack B. Weinstein & Eileen B. Hershenov, The Effect of Equity on Mass
Tort Law, 1991 U ILL. L. REV. 269, 290 ("Our view is that from the beginning, mass
torts should be treated similarly to a bankruptcy proceeding. No matter how finan-
cially healthy the defendants in these huge cases, the sheer number of present and
future victims means that we are ultimately dealing with a limited compensation
fund.").
286. NCCUSL's Model Punitive Damages Act goes further than any state tort re-
form by permitting the trial judge to give credit for awards assessed in other
jurisdictions. In section 10(b) the defendant is given an opportunity to produce evi-
dence of the prior awards to prevent duplicative punishment. Section 10(c) provides
factors for the trial judge to consider in determining whether punitive damages
should be reduced in a multiple punishment scenario. NCCUSL's guidelines include
the purposes of punitive damages, how the awards were calculated, and whether de-
fendant has already disgorged economic gain. Finally, there is a provision for the stay
of a judgment to determine whether credit should be given for prior punitive damage
awards in section 10(d). While too much credit for past punitive damages assessments
may lead to under-deterrence, this reform makes sense where a firm may be bank-
rupted by repeated punitive damage awards.
287. 114 S. Ct. 2331 (1994).
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was one of the few procedural safeguards which the com-
mon law provided against that danger.2
The compulsory post-verdict test should be extended to all
civil punishment whether prosecuted by public or private attor-
neys general. The most common tests for assessing whether a
given award is excessive are whether it shocks the conscience of
the court and whether it is so large that it suggests that the jury
has succumbed to passion or prejudice."9 Sending a legitimate
message of community outrage through a large award comes
perilously close to violating these traditional standards. The
current standard is too vague to provide proper guidance to the
judiciary.
Present day courts are not reluctant to overrule jury punitive
damage awards.29 Downward post-verdict adjustments or out-
right reversals are ordered in about half of all punitive damage
verdicts in product liability cases. 1 In medical malpractice
cases, appellate courts apply strict scrutiny, vacating, remitting
or reversing punitive damages on a routine basis.92 Compulsory
post-verdict review of all crimtorts offer defendants protection
against runaway juries or overzealous prosecutors. Factors that
may be considered in assessing the size of the punitive damage
award should, at a minimum include: wealth of the defendant,
actual harm to the plaintiff, and potential harm to the society.
288. Id. at 2340-41.
289. Many states review punitive damage awards by asking whether a given ver-
dict is a product of "passion or prejudice." Ghiardi and Kircher state: "A widely used
test to determine if the jury's punitive damage award is subject to judicial interven-
tion is whether such award indicates that the jury was guided by passion or prejudice
or some other improper considerations outside the evidence." 2 GHIARDI & KIRCHER,
supra note 141, § 18.02, at 6. California courts determine whether the award is exces-
sive as a matter of law or raises a presumption that it is a product of passion or
prejudice. See Cates Constr., Inc. v. Talbort Partners, 53 Cal. App. 4th 1420 (1997).
290. Post-trial motions for remittitur, directed verdict, and judgments notwith-
standing the verdict are other checks on the misuse of wealth in awarding punitive
damages. Post-verdict motions test the sufficiency of the evidence as well as the
amount of punitive damages. A trial judge presents the plaintiff with Hobson's choice
when a remittitur is entered. A plaintiff must accept the trial judge's reduction or
submit to a new trial. In remitting punitive damages, the court may only reduce the
verdict to the highest amount which a jury could properly have awarded.
291. See Rustad, supra note 24, at 54-59.
292. See Rustad & Koenig, supra note 33, at 1012.
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CONCLUSION
Crimtort remedies will increasingly be utilized to control so-
cially harmful conduct that escapes prosecution on the criminal
side of the law. Legal scholars and practitioners alike must ad-
just their thinking to accommodate the development of this
legal hybrid of crimtorts. Judges and policymakers have been
forced to smuggle crimtort protection into the common law on a
patchwork basis rather than develop it as a coherent body of
law. Instead of being troubled by the overlap of criminal and tort
law, the American legal system needs to develop procedural pro-
tection that will balance the interests of both the public and
crimtort defendants.
Civil punishment that is calibrated by wealth has the unique
ability to adapt to social change and emergent abuses of power.
As American society transformed from an agrarian-based econ-
omy to the modern industrialized state, crimtort remedies such
as punitive damages evolved to control the excesses of industrial
capitalism. Punitive damages have increasingly been employed
to punish and deter toxic pollution, defective products, and dan-
gerous medical practices. As the United States enters the
information age, new abuses of power will emerge that the gov-
ernment is ill-equipped to control. Wealth-based civil penalties
and punitive damages will play a crucial role in punishing and
deterring these new forms of social deviance.
This Article has presented the first empirical study of the im-
pact of wealth in high stakes punitive damages adjudication.
This data demonstrates that punitive damage awards are gen-
erally rationally related to corporate wealth. Still, some
aberrant punitive damage awards occur. Orderly and principled
intermediate procedural rules must be instituted in order to
properly deal with such outliers. Criminal standards such as
sentencing guidelines or proof beyond a reasonable doubt are
too stringent for civil punishment, while ordinary civil stan-
dards are too lax to adequately protect crimtort defendants.
The reforms proposed here-compulsory bifurcation, a stan-
dard of clear and convincing evidence, clarification of jury
instructions, prevention of overkill, and the institution of rigor-
ous post-verdict reviews of civil punishment verdicts-are
already emerging on an ad hoc basis. Explicit recognition of the
crimtort paradigm will accelerate the adoption of an appropriate
level of procedural protection. These reforms will rein in the ex-
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treme verdicts without crippling a vitally important remedy for
punishing and deterring quasi-criminal conduct.
